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1
"Is there still such a subject," Isaiah Berlin has asked, "as Political
Theory?" 1 John Wilson's newest book, the sixth to come from this
relatively young (thirty-eight) English moral philosopher, will not settle
the issue. If anything, it is evidence on both sides of the question.
If we think of political theory as any attempt to examine the great
public issues of the day in the light of universal ethical principles, Mr.
Wilson's book certainly qualifies for library classification on the same
shelves as all the major and minor works of political thought referred
to in college courses "from Plato to the present." But if we think of it
as an effort to champion a great public cause by marshalling all the
arguments in favor and refuting the arguments against-in the sense
that Plato and Aristotle championed the cause of the just polls, or
Hobbes of absolutism and Locke of Whiggery, or even as Sartre and
Camus have spoken for the idealistic but alienated man of our time-
then Wilson's book is not political theory but something else and
something less.
Style is one index to the difference. Wilson's treatise will surely not
be read with pleasure or enthusiasm or even great benefit by those who
do not share the intellectual outlook and interests of the school of
philosophy in which he has chosen to swim. For Wilson is one of the
new breed of "analytic philosophers" or, as they are also known,
"linguistic philosophers." And that is a rather different kettle of fish
from what most of us are accustomed to in political theory. Isaiah
Berlin, by contrast, while he is sympathetic toward the newer mode, is
himself a representative of an older tradition that may be said to have
been begun by Hegel early in the nineteenth century. In this tradition
the philosopher works as an historian of ideas, taking his bearings from
what has been thought before and offering his own reflections in an
effort to extend the dialogue into the present.2
1. Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist? in PHILOSOPHY, POL1ICS AND SOCIETY 1
(Laslett & Runciman eds., 2d series, 1962). See Cobban, The Decline of Political Theory,
68 POL. SCI. Q. 321 (1953), for a similar inquiry.
2. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE REBEL (1957); MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION (1954), AR.
cUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1955); and WOLN, POLITS AND VISION (1960).
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The older perspective is likely to make the philosopher supremely
conscious of the obdurate character of conflicting political values and
intellectual systems. Berlin, for example, maintains almost as a matter
of course that the differences among atheists and theists, mechanistic
determinists and Christians, Hegelians and empiricists, romantic irra-
tionalists and Marxists "are not, at least prima facie, either logical or
empirical, and have usually and rightly been classified as irreducibly
philosophical." 3 Wilson, on the other hand, while he would acknowl-
edge the existence of these differences, thinks it the job of the philoso-
pher to cut through such disagreements to reach the truth-insofar as
the truth can be ascertained by reason. Like J. L. Austin and R. M.
Hare, the only other philosophers he cites with a sense of affinity, Wil-
son makes it quite clear that he means to try to interdict such contro-
versy, to cry a halt to the babble of opinion, "to stop people using words
just anyhow," as he puts it (p. 11) with a rare show of indignation.
Social scientists are invited to play their part in impeding the volume
of untruth by discovering the facts and showing up deviations from
them. But the philosopher's responsibility is to examine the arguments
over the significance of facts, so as to distinguish proper from unvar-
ranted inference, and, in the sphere of morals, to separate sense from
nonsense in order, hopefully, to put a final grinding halt to the tumult
and shouting of propagandists and ideologists.
Unlike Berlin, therefore, Wilson has little patience with the some-
times paralyzing experience of ineluctable diversity that has struck
students of political thought so forcibly in this century.4 He is rather
crisp, even to the point of flippancy, in renouncing a good portion of
the intellectual inheritance of almost 2500 years of recorded Western
history. "Different political philosophies," he asserts almost in passing,
"were in the past little more than the strong feelings of certain groups
of people who wanted certain specific things, and who dressed up their
feelings in philosophical guise to make them look impressive" (p. 13).
Rather strong words, these, when we consider that they amount to a
kind of wholesale dismissal of the entire history of Western political
thought, including not only the output of the classical philosophers
but also that of the modems-the Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists,
Pluralists, and so forth, with all their neo-orthodox and revisionist
3. Berlin, supra note 1, at 8.
4. See, e.g., the work of Karl Mannheim. Even as he calls for a "s)thesis of prospec-
tives," Mannheim recognizes that "today there are too many points of view of equal value
and prestige, each showing the relativity of the other, to permit us to take an), one position
and to regard it as impregnable and absolute." MLuNNmsrUM, IDEOLOGY ADI) UTOPIA 75 (1936).
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progeny thrown in for good measure. All of them, it seems, have not
really been philosophers but only misguided amateurs with strong feel-
ings, weak minds, and insecure positions. How secure in his own mental
fortress must a contemporary philosopher feel to be capable of such
hauteurl
We must ourselves nevertheless try to exercise more forbearance to-
ward Wilson than he does toward his predecessors. Iconoclasm is after
all the stock-in-trade of new movements in moral philosophy. We might
expect Wilson to engage in even more polemical debunking than he
actually goes in for. What is really important, after all, is that at a time
when the subject of equality inflames passions everywhere and arouses
confusion in such practical matters as apportionment, voting, and taxa-
tion, a book has finally been written with the intention of setting forth
a universal principle of equality on rational grounds alone.5 This in
itself would be enough to warrant earnest consideration. The fact that
this long-deferred task has been undertaken by a representative of a
major new tendency in philosophy only makes it even more imperative
that we examine the result both for its intrinsic value and for its historic
significance.
2
For the purposes of such an examination it is arresting and interest-
ing that although Wilson has little use for most prior movements in
social thought, he should be very respectful toward at least one such
movement, namely psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst, according to
Wilson, has raised a standard to which the wise and honest philosopher
ought to repair. To understand his own role, the philosopher too must
see himself as "a liberator rather than a moralist" (p. 11). To under-
stand the spread and swell of the demand for equality he must view it
in the light of a cardinal psychoanalytic metaphor-the evolution of
humanity from a state of childish dependence toward one of psychic
and cultural maturity (p. 36). Even to understand what equality itself
means he is well advised to refer to what Freud called the "transfer-
ence," or the relationship that develops between the analyst and his
patient. "The context of psychoanalysis," Wilson writes,
stands as a model case, not because of any truth or falsity in the
5. LAKoFF, EQUALTrY IN PounicAL PHILOSOPHY (1964). My book is intended only as a
study in the history of egalitarian ideas. A forthcoming edition of Nomos, the journal of
the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, to be issued in 1967 as volume
nine in the series, will examine equality from a number of points of view, including the
philosophical, religious, and legal. It is being edited by J. Roland Pennock and John Chap.
man and published by the Atherton Press.
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claims of psychoanalytical theory, but because it is at least in-
tended to be a context designed specifically for the improvement
of the ability to communicate and the ability to love. There is an
important sense in which the patient, even though he is mentally
ill, is treated as an equal: his desires and the expression of his de-
sires are not crushed: he is not subject to force, threats, emotional
pressure or even advice on the part of the analyst: he is not made
to feel guilty, wicked, ashamed, or frightened. He is encouraged
to be himself and to become aware of himself. He is educated, but
not indoctrinated (pp. 161-62).
Finally, as the psychoanalyst tries to make the contents of his patient's
id accessible to the conscious control of his ego, so the philosopher must
try to help people learn what it is they really want and how they may
expect to fulfill their true desires (p. 117).
In drawing this last parallel, Wilson must make the rather crucial as-
sumption that everyone has the capacity to direct his own will and, that
given a choice, he would prefer to exercise his own judgment. The
capacity may be crippled by psychic illness, Wilson acknowledges, but
the more common affliction is of another sort. Most people are "be-
witched" (a favorite word of analytic philosophers) by illusions. The
job of the philosopher is to bring them to confront reality. Like the psy-
choanalyst, the philosopher can consider himself successful only to the
extent that the man he is trying to help not only becomes aware of his
own desires but is enabled to "accept himself for what he is and hence
choose more rationally... The rational person would be the person
whose values would remain the same even after the most exhaustive
analysis: the irrational person would come to see that his moral views
were based on distortions of desires which he had not fully faced" (p.
148).
In these respects Wilson deliberately patterns his approach upon that
ideally pursued by the psychoanalyst. In others, a similarity is evident
though not explicitly recognized. Whereas the pysychoanalyst works
with dream material and the patient's free associations, the analytic
philosopher works with conversations he imagines and with ordinary
language. Wilson might object to this description of his method.
"Words," he contends, are not the philosopher's "subject-matter but his
method. He works by continual cross-reference, moving from a situa-
tion in real life to the words we might use to describe it, back again to
the situation, then back again to the words, and so forth" (p. 7). But
the fact is that the situations referred to are often word-games. And
even when they are not, what is important about them to the analytic
philosopher is not the direct bearing they have on the substantive issue
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he is considering, but the indirect help they give in clarifying the state.
ments he is examining for their logical meaning. Thus Wilson headt
one small chapter "the power 6lite" and another "class distinctions."
In neither of them does he explore the subjects indicated by the titles
in any depth. Although he never bothers to define the term, for ex-
ample, he readily asserts that "a ruling class or power 61ite is inevitable"
(p. 173). But it is not his intention to decide what a power 6lite is or
whether it exists. His concern is only to define an egalitarian attitude
toward what he takes to be a situation in real life. It is the logic of the
egalitarian position, rather than the real-life situation, that occupies his
attention.
Still another way in which the analytic philosopher resembles the
psychoanalyst is in his preference for the commonplace as against what
most of us are likely to take as more significant realms of experience.
Since politics is an affair of statesmen and administrators, he contends,
it should be treated only when we become familiar enough with prin-
ciples derived from our own more immediate experience. We all have
neighbors and bosses. Before we try to look behind the newspaper head-
lines we should first come to grips with our own environment. By re-
ferring to these everyday experiences the philosopher tries "to make
us feel at home" with subjects customarily examined in more remote
contexts (p. 8). True to his announced intentions, Wilson tells us very
little about such burning issues as apartheid or even such merely smol-
dering ones as progressive taxation. But we hear a great deal about
hypothetical husbands scolding or caressing their wives, doctors treat-
ing patients, zookeepers tending animals, children playing Monopoly
or dividing chocolate, and adults (what up-to-date English philosopher
could do without these exhibitionists?) playing tennis, chess, and poker.
Unlike the psychoanalyst, however, the analytic philosopher does not
maintain that all public relationships are simply family affairs writ
large. He merely assumes that principles found relevant in one context
will likely prove relevant in others.
In this relatively minor respect, as in the more important ones, the
analytic philosopher resembles the psychoanalyst only in the most
superficial way. Hell may be a city much like London, as a poet once sug-
gested, but it will still apparently take a Viennese rather than a native
Londoner to draw an adequate map of it. For the analytic philosopher
recognizes no separate realms of conscious and unconscious; he prefers
to speak of reason and confusion, as though psychology had taught us
nothing since Condillac. He does not deal with the powerful instinctual
forces that Freud saw expressed in part in the id, but instead discusses
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our "desires," as though these never amounted to more than our prefer-
ences for chocolate over vanilla. Since he is concerned only with logical
argument, he does not bother to consider whether the human mind has
rules of its own, rules that Freud thought indispensable to an under-
standing of what he called mental functioning. He has only the most
simple-minded view of the psychoanalytic transference, in which the
analyst is called upon to play the role of authority, educator, reformer,
and, as Freud described him, "doctor of the soul." It does not occur to
him that however egalitarian the situation may appear, the theoretical
context in which it proceeds and the therapeutic end it serves may well
bring about an entirely different result in actuality. He cannot imagine,
as Freud could, to his constant sorrow, that the price of gratifying our
wishes might be the collapse of society. Instead he casually assumes-
as Freud wanted to believe but never quite could-that civilization is
a progressive march toward universal autonomy, blocked only by the
last vestiges of prejudice and error. How could he possibly perceive, as
Freud did, that social order might require both the illusion of equality
and a political structure based upon hierarchy and dependence?0
It would be charitable to say that in psychoanalysis Wilson has chosen
a model whose complexity he does not fully appreciate. But the inter-
pretation he offers and the parallels he pursues give us a rather good
idea of what he takes to be his own task as a philosopher. We might
guess from what he says about psychoanalysis and what he takes to be
the role for philosophy that his approach to the subject of his treatise,
the concept of equality, will be more direct and less ambivalent than
that of Freud, but also less powerful, less insightful, and less supple.
And so, alas, it is.
"An egalitarian would hold that if everyone has an equal need of
food then everyone should have an equal right to it...." Wilson does
not assert that there is in fact such a need or such a right, but he does
assume that there is such a person as "an" or "the" egalitarian. In the
history of western thought a great many different ideas have found
expression that can be labeled egalitarian. Locke argued that although
the earth had been given to mankind in common, the conventional
division into private holdings was a legitimate recognition of the natu-
ral disparity of talent and effort. The radical French revolutionary
(and co-author of the Manifesto of the Equals), Franqois-Noel (Gracchus)
6. For Freud's views on equality, see FREUD, GROUP Ps'cdoLoy AND TiE A.%ALYSIS OF
THE F.;o (Strachey trans. 1951); LAXOFF, op. cit. supra note 5, at 183-93. For a thorough
and properly subtle view of Freudian theory and practice, see RmFF, FRFUD: Tim Mm'D OF
THE MORALIST (1959).
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Babeuf, thought otherwise. He bitterly attacked the idea of the moder-
ates that some inequalities of income could be justified along the lines
that Locke had laid out. It was, Babeuf held, "absurd and unjust" to
award greater compensation to those whose work required a "higher
degree of intelligence and more application and tension of the spirit."
For "that does not extend the capacity of the stomach at all."
3
Wilson is of course quite unconcerned with the record of conflicting
interpretations. For him the history of ideas is little more than the pre-
history of philosophy. He would rather wipe the slate clean and engage
the reader in a game of words, with the objective of arriving, by the use
of reason alone, at some universal idea of equality that would express a
kind of common sense of mankind. "I hope to show," Wilson writes,
by a careful analysis of what people have meant by "equality" and
of the way in which it interlocks with other concepts such as justice
and liberty, that there is at least one sort of equality which has
been, as it were, latent in our thinking and which has great im-
portance not only for politics in the narrow sense but for all per-
sonal relationships (p. 11).
When people speak of equality, he contends, they do not ordinarily
use the term as a word of praise but rather in a purely descriptive sense:
"It would be natural to demand justice or equity as a right: whereas
'Justice, 0 Kingl' is natural, 'Equality, 0 Kingl' is not" (p. 17). Popular
usage, however, is only a partial guide. To form a comprehensive view
of what "statements" concerning equality convey we must deposit them
in a number of categories: political principle, assertions of fact, formal
principle (by which Wilson means the general notion of impartiality),
an ideal, and particular examples of practical application.
The statements about equality that arise in all of these categories,
Wilson argues, express the same latent idea. This he defines as the
liberal idea: "The way of life most egalitarians wish to advocate ...
might be fairly described as the liberal way of life" (p. 128). The ques-
tion to be answered becomes: "What is it that believers in equality, and
liberals in general, really have to sell?" (P. 21.)
The liberal's bill of goods, he replies, is an "ideal and a metaphysical
truth which can be rationally defended by reference to human na-
ture.. ." (p. 22). But in examining the liberal view of human nature
Wilson admits that whenever we refer to the subject we all manage to
7. Advielle, 2 Hsron DE GRAccus BABEUp Er DuE BABouvismr, 41 (1884).
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select those elements that support our point of view and ignore others
(p. 45). He also acknowledges that any view of human nature must
recognize that people differ not only in intelligence and talents but
even in intention, capacity for effort, and ability to exercise choice.
Human nature, moreover, is commonly influenced by factors outside
human control (p. 71). The entire subject, he finally confesses, is mud-
died (p. 88).
What then is the natural condition that gives rise to the latent idea
of equality that is in turn put forward by liberal theorists and politi-
cians? The answer Wilson offers comes as rather a let-down. It is simply
the human capacity for free will-the fact that people "have wills of
their own, and can choose and create their own values" (p. 22). This
capacity, it would seem, is what gives rise to the belief in human equal-
ity and what sustains the belief as a perfectly rational conclusion. Wil-
son does not regard "this fact alone" as sufficient justification for the
liberal position. But it is fair to say that his elaboration of free will into
the capacity for rational discussion does not greatly enhance the orig-
inal assertion. Philosophically defined, it would appear, egalitarianism
is a belief in fraternal communication inspired and justified by the
common human capacity for the exercise of choice in the sphere of
values.
If the conclusion is disappointing, it is at least partly because the
chain of reasoning that leads to it is weak at so many points. To begin
with, is it really so uncommon for people to demand equality as well as
justice?8 Asking it of the king is another matter. Nowadays all that
people ask of kings is that they pose for postage stamps and stay within
their household allowances. If in the past subjects demanded justice
from kings rather than equality, surely it was largely because a demand
for equality would have been looked upon as an act of high treason.
It would have been taken, and rightly, as a subversive indictment of the
very basis of royal authority. Why else was the famous medieval couplet,
"When Adam delved and Eve did span/Who was then the gentleman?"
so popular yet so anonymous?
The identification of the demand for equality with liberalism may
be acceptable if what is meant is that it arose in the context of what is
often broadly referred to as "the rise of liberalism," although even this
is a misleading interpretation. But surely it is far more misleading to
ignore the fact that the liberal notion of equality does not represent or
8. What are we to make, for example, of the dvil rights slogans which explicitly demand
equality and "one man, one vote" or of books lMee: TAWNEY, Equtrry (1931); Gnutts,
EQUALTY iN AzumucA (1964); HEmror, Tnm NEW EQuALrrY (1964).
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include the conception of equality that socialists and conservatives are
likely to entertain. The conservative view may perhaps be put aside on
grounds that conservatives are hostile to equality as an ideal. But what
of the socialist view? Are we to suppose that when Marx issued his
Critique of the Gotha Program in order to draw a distinction between
the ideals of bourgeois liberalism and those of socialism (and also to
distinguish socialism from communism), he was bewitching himself and
his followers? The historical fact is, of course, that a rather important
conflict has developed between liberals and socialists (and between the
societies that subscribe to the two sets of values they advocate) over
the meaning of such ideals as equality. Even Wilson's fundamental
assumption that all men share a capacity for free will is not one that an
orthodox Marxist could accept as a starting point for a definition of
equality. Unless we define mankind to exclude Marxists (a perilous
definition in view of the birth rate in certain Communist countries),
of what value is Wilson's allegedly universal principle?
Most important of all, is it not a form of delusion to assume that all
men are capable of creating their own values? Nietzsche thought that
to achieve such a condition it would be necessary to rear a new species
of man, an "overman." He was scarcely confident that civilization
would succeed in the effort. It behooves us at least to be skeptical to-
ward the view that the task has already been performed. If ideals are
not to be illusory and if they are not to promote certain disappointment,
surely we ought to ground them on what we have reason to think is true
rather than purely on what we hope will someday be the case.
4
It is easy enough, but unsatisfying, to demonstrate that Wilson has
failed in his effort. We must also ask why it is that such an investigation
as he has made has yielded such a frail and dubious result. It is not that
he is himself incapable of the task. Despite the shortcomings of the
work, Wilson's reasoning is often deft and his expression-if we give
him the benefit of our doubts about his method-can be clear and
precise. The real trouble is that although in his own way he too has
discovered the hard fact that political values are diverse-the fact that
there are disagreements which, in Berlin's words, are "irreducibly
philosophical"-he has refused to accept the only logical consequence
of the discovery. That would be of course to admit that the effort to
prescribe a single ideal of equality with serious political bearing (as
distinct from a merely ethical ideal with more limited application) is
inherently impossible.
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In the face of this implacable diversity of values, the only universally
acceptable egalitarian ideal that anyone could possibly arrive at would
inevitably be as vague and as pragmatically inconsequential as the one
Wilson advances. He could just as easily have used the same sort of
reasoning to arrive at a belief in "human dignity" or in the "essential
rights of man as man" or some other such popular piety with about the
same relevance to political life. It is not as though the problem of
diversity eludes him. "If two people differ in their ultimate criteria
of values or rules for behaviour," he declares, "then-precisely because
these criteria and rules are ultimate-they have no higher criteria or
rules by which to settle their differences" (p. 97). Having had the good
sense and the courage to state this obvious but threatening truism, he
should have realized that the word-game was over.
Instead he pronounces a sermon from the lofty heights of Mount
Non-Sequitur: since there may well be conflicts of value which may not
be amenable to philosophic resolution, he argues, the task of the liberal
is to persuade others to abandon their points of view and accept his
own! The liberal must show that "it is ultimately irrational" to prefer
relations of domination to relations of equality (p. 154)-even, presum-
ably, if his antagonist values hierarchy as an indispensable condition
of culture, order, and good taste or if the sort of equality he would
accept (in property ownership, for example) would violate a liberal
canon.
The difficulty, not to say the absurdity, of this position is evident in
an example that Wilson offers. He imagines a dialogue with a dictator
in which (not unexpectedly) the subject of language plays a vital part.
The dictator maintains that since his language does not include a word
for pain, he will not take the capacity of people to feel pain into ac-
count in his social system. If he is reproached on the ground that by
allo-ving some people to torture others he presides over an unfair
society, he could logically reply that the question of fairness depends
upon criteria: since the feeling of pain is not one of his criteria, the
system cannot be judged with reference to it. The egalitarian, Wilson
suggests, may claim the dictator is only pretending not to recognize this
aspect of human nature. But this would not necessarily convince him.
In order to convince the dictator, the egalitarian must show that by
recognizing the human capacity to feel pain he would gain better con-
trol over reality. Wilson comments:
It is often the case that tyrants and dictators pretend to forget, or
perhaps actually do forget, natural similarities which exist even
within their own language, and criteria which are part of the
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common human heritage. The egalitarian has to jog their memory,
or accuse them of dishonesty. Secondly, if we discover new similari-
ties, or produce new criteria, the egalitarian can reasonably say
that the authorities ought to attend to them. For if they are genuine
they can be shown to give us more control and greater predictive
powers, and this is universally accepted to be desirable.
There is of course something so unrealistic about the idea of carrying
on such an argument with a dictator (would a Gestapo agent serve as
parliamentarian?) that we may well be tempted to dismiss the entire
hypothesis as too much of a strain on our credulity. But we can at least
concede that if Wilson's final point is correct, i.e., that truth will out
because truth improves the ability to control reality, then the truth may
occur to the dictator without anyone telling him.
But the real weakness of the suggestion is in what the substantive
point reveals of Wilson's political naivet6. Reading this passage brings
to mind Pierre Boule's story of The Bridge on the River Kwai and
especially the confrontation between a liberal and a dictator so well
portrayed in the film version of the novel by Alec Guinness and Sessue
Hayakawa. It will be recalled that Guinness, as the captive British
officer, first tries to persuade the tyrannical Japanese prison camp com-
mander that his brutal treatment of prisoners and his unwillingness
to respect the Geneva Convention are unfair and illegal. Hayakawa
responds with contempt and proceeds to make an example of Guinness
by putting him in solitary confinement. Guinness finally succeeds in
changing Hayakawa's mind when he demonstrates by his determined
resistance that if the Japanese officer intends to build his bridge on
time he must have the cooperation of his prisoners and that to win this
cooperation he must take a more liberal attitude toward the rights of
prisoners of war.
At first recall, the example seems to be an apt illustration of what
Wilson has in mind. In fact, the lesson is actually quite a different one
from the one Wilson draws from his hypothetical confrontation. Clearly
Guinness' success does not depend upon his ability to "jog the dictator's
memory," for Hayakawa can only remember the code of Bushido, ac-
cording to which prisoners are cowardly soldiers who have brought
unspeakable disgrace upon themselves by surrendering and therefore
do not deserve honorable treatment. Nor does it depend upon Guin-
ness' ability to persuade Hayakawa by argument that it would better
serve his interest to change the rules of the game. For Guinness to win
the point, he has to display extraordinary personal heroism. Had Guin-
ness been a lesser man, or perhaps not an actor portraying a role, he
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might well have knuckled under and lost the game. Faced with the
alternative of continual persecution and perhaps of certain death, he
and his men might have given up their resistance and done what was
demanded of them in order to survive. It is conceivable that the slave
laborers whom Hitler and his henchmen treated as members of a lower
race of men could have gained better treatment by resisting their over-
seers. But how many actually did? And is it not likely that individual
or even group resistance would have been utterly futile?
In any case the point is that it would not necessarily pay a dictator
to observe ethical rules or liberal political values. On the contrary, his
interest may require just the opposite. The survival of a dictatorial
regime may well depend upon the dictator's success in destroying the
dignity of his subjects, in brutalizing them to the point at which they
become unwilling and unable to resist. If Wilson had only been less
concerned with word-games and more alive to the realities of political
life he might have gained some insight into the tragic quality of life
under a totalitarian regime. Instead, he reduces the confrontation to
the dimensions of an Oxford debate, and concludes that it should be
possible to persuade a dictator to become a liberal by appealing to his
self-interest on rational grounds.
But it is no use asking the historically impossible. It took the French
resistance to produce modem Existentialism. The cold war and Eng-
land's withdrawal from a leading political role have in a sense produced
analytic philosophy. To those who specialize in the examination of
language but have no commitment to some political reform or defense,
the highest ideal is bound to appear to be "communication." And this
ideal, needless to say, is Wilson's final word. It is celebrated as the very
matrix of morality and justice and as the essence of the act of love.
(Epilogue, pp. 208-216.)
However unsatisfactory we may find such an ideal, its emergence is
understandable given the present historical context. In the last century
the older more substantive political philosophies became frozen into
political ideologies. This century has experienced what has been called
the "end of ideology"-in the sense that all the old ideologies have come
to seem stale and irrelevant. In the advanced societies a new pragmatic
spirit has arisen out of a skepticism toward the old ideas and a willing-
ness to experiment. Soviet economists now dare advise the Party leader-
ship that certain instruments of the bourgeois capitalist economy, such
as competition among firms, are valuable instruments even in a socialist
system. A demand has even arisen in the communist bloc for free elec-
tions, on the ground that they would promote stability, eliminate the
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need for occasional destabilizing purges, and make the succession of
leadership regular and acceptable. In the "capitalist" countries the sort
of comprehensive economic planning that was once anathema gains
more and more popularity. And even the most Spencerian liberals are
coming to recognize, by deeds if not by words, that a society cannot de-
grade the lifd of the poor without creating a social climate unbearable
for all.
In this vacuum of positive commitment, the belief of the analytic
philosopher in communication is perhaps the only appropriate ideal.
It is in a real sense the ideology of political and social co-existence. The
age of the analytical philosopher is also the age in which Lyndon John-
son asks, "come, let us reason together," and his critics complain of a
credibility gap. It is the age in which a leading cultural critic declares
that "the medium is the message." It is the age of summit conferences
and seemingly endless debates in the Security Council. It is the age in
which we seek, above all else, the pragmatic consensus, domestic and
international, that comes from successful communication.
Under the circumstances, communication is not an ideal to be dis-
missed lightly. But neither is it sufficient to our needs. Survival is not a
way of life but only a necessary condition of political creativity. Here
analytic philosophy can no longer help us. What is disquieting is that
we do need help. For the future poses an extraordinary challenge to
those concerned with the problem of equality. Wilson rightly notes that
"as our powers over nature increase, we are bound to become less inter-
ested in what men are, and more interested in what we make them to
be" (p. 49). As the problems of scarcity are increasingly overcome, the
older conceptions of the egalitarian ideal become increasingly obsolete.
But as we try to come to grips with the medical and genetic revolutions
of our time we will be compelled to make social decisions far in advance
of what we have so far been able to decide about these ideals. Instead
of asking ourselves whether and in what respects men are created equal,
we may soon have to ask whether and in what respects they ought to be
created equal. When that happens we shall need an understanding of
human values well beyond what the analytic philosopher apparently
can provide.
SANFORD LAKOFFf
t" Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook. BA.
1953, Brandeis University; M.A. 1955, Ph.D. 1959, Harvard University.
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Rush to Judgment. By Mark Lane. New York: Holt, Rine-
hart &Winston, Inc. Pp. 478. $5.95 (1966).
The twin murders of President Kennedy and his alleged assassin,
coming thirteen months after the Cuban missile crisis, sent shudders of
fear through the country. It seemed that the American system was
again on the brink of instability, if not destruction. Lyndon B. Johnson,
among others, suspected a mass conspiracy. Later, to create the appear-
ance of stability and credibility, he used an old method.
On November 29, 1963, the President's Commission on the Assasina-
tion of President Kennedy was "created" . . . "in recognition of the
right of people everywhere to full and truthful knowledge concerning
these events." 1 In its Report, the President's Commission stated that it
endeavored "to fulfill that right and to appraise this tragedy by the light
of reason and the standard of fairness. [The Report] has been prepared
with a deep awareness of the Commission's responsibility to present to
the American people an objective report of the facts relating to the
assassination."
2
The political reasons for the appointment of the President's Com-
mission were obvious: to quiet the doubts of the nation and the world
by securing the unanimous agreement of the most irreproachable mem-
bers of the society-men whose political views were respectively dif-
ferent but whose reputations for veracity and gravitas were beyond
reproach. If these men, neither jurors nor peers of Oswald, validated
the investigation, the public would believe and the ship of state would
continue to sail. The President chose members of Congress and the
judiciary to employ and coopt the other brandies of government in the
executive's investigation.
The President's Commission was intended to foreclose any Congres-
sional investigation, grand jury proceedings in Texas, or any other
national criminal investigative proceedings. It was granted a monopoly
charter to find out what happened in Dallas. Monopolies enjoy power,
but they must expect scrutiny.
The Commission's objective, or pretense as some would have it, has
come under attack by a group of "independent entrepreneurs" and
amateur watchdogs who emerged to write articles and books and advance
1. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE AssS.AssNATION OF PRESWE.%r KENI EoDY nT
1 (1954) [hereinafter cited as PaRsmDENT's CoMrt'N RnP.]. The members of the Commis-
sion were Earl Warren, Richard Russell, Hale Boggs, John S. Cooper, Gerald Ford, Allen
Dulles, and John McCloy.
2. Ibid.
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theories about the murder itself,3 the operation of the Commision and
its purposes.4
A special sort of advocate-entrepreneur of the case was Mark Lane,
a New York lawyer and former State Assemblyman. He was approached
by Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, the mother of the alleged assassin, to rep-
resent the interests of Lee Oswald before the President's Commission.'
Prior to the publication of his best selling book Rush to Judgment,
Lane was viewed in the press as a lawyer who sought publicity for him-
self at the expense of good and honorable men at a time of deep na-
tional tragedy. The director of the FBI, while attempting to discredict
Mrs. Marguerite Oswald as emotionally unstable, used as "indication
of her emotional instability 'the retaining of a lawyer that anyone
would not have retained if they were serious in trying to get down to
the facts.' "
There are flaws in Mark Lane's book, some of them disturbing7
because they cast doubt on Lane's entire effort. Yet it is a book with
which proponents of the Commission must reckon. It raises questions
which go to the heart of the case, questions never answered by the
Commission Report.8
Reading through the Commission Report and its record gives one
3. "Independent entrepreneurs" is a term used by Tom Adler to describe those who by
independent investigation want to break down the monopoly of information and view-
point which is given out by official organs of the society.
4. A fairly complete list of books and articles on the PREsIDENT's Comss ISSlON REP.
can be found in 112 CONG. REc. 23206-07 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1966).
5. It will be noted that I do not refer to the Commission as the Warren Commission
since neither is it the correct name nor does it describe adequately where the final re-
sponsibility for the government must rest.
6. Trevor-Roper, Introduction to MAKu LANE, RUSH TO JUDGMENT 9 (1965).
7. For example, Lane refers to a Dr. Howard Bonar, who allegedly was the eye doctor
for an alleged eyewitness to the man in the sixth-floor depository window. No Dr. Bonar
is listed among Dallas doctors and optometrists or in the AMA Directory.
8. Regardless of the validity of Lane's criticism of the Commission's theories, he at least
tried to represent Oswald's interests. But what is one supposed to say about the curious
role which Walter Craig, the Commission appointed lawyer, was to play? Craig, who was
President of the American Bar Association and at the time an unconfirmed judicial ap-
pointee to the Federal District bench in Arizona, was not supposed to represent anybody,
although his task was to "in fairness to the alleged assassin and his family... (whose in.
terests were adverse] participate in the investigation and to advise the Commission whether
in his opinion the proceedings conformed to the basic principles of American justice. Mr.
Craig accepted this assignment and without limitation attended Commission hearings in
person or through his appointed assistants. He had the right of cross examination, recall
of any witnesses prior to his appointment and the right of suggestion of witnesses. PaRsI-
DENT'S COMM'N RE'. 10. Lane states that there is no record of Craig asking the Commission
to call a prospective witness, or recall a witness. LANE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 879. On rare
occasions Craig or his associates might ask a question or two, "but such questions were
either of minor importance or were asked solely for the purpose of assisting to fasten guilt
more firmly onto the absent defendant." Ibid. In effect, Judge Craig and his associates were
counsels to the Commission and its staff. They were not Oswald's counsel. Suggestions
which they made were given to counsel and Commission privately. It seems to this author,
therefore, that the Commission put Craig in an impossible position.
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the impression that Lane was put on continuous trial. He was followed
on various occasions. 9 In the Archive files there are a number of refer-
ences to FBI reports about Lane, some still secret. 10 On the other hand,
Lane's account clearly suggests that he wants to "get even with" Chief
Justice Warren for several reasons: for the difficulties he encountered
at the hands of the Chief Justice; for Warren's doubting the truthful-
ness of a telephone conversation between Lane and Mrs. Helen Mark-
ham (she was a witness to the Tippit murder; Lane taped the conversa-
tion but she denied having it);" and for being charged with hampering
the Commission's work.
The Commission's Methodology
Disagreement between eye witnesses to an event and those who must
later reconstruct it is not unnatural. Nor is it unnatural that people
will lie, assume too much, or see different "truths." Mannheim, and the
classic Japanese movie, Rashomon, about a rape (or perhaps a seduc-
tion) teach us that our own experience influences our perception.
Events in the lives of the investigators and investigated affect their
judgments and actions, though they have no relation to the original
cause of the investigation. This to some extent explains the bewilder-
ing cascade of opinions, emphases, and "facts" presented in this case.
Virtually all of the critics complain bitterly about the Commission's
methodology. It is a method widely used in the government. No account
is taken for error. When another "shop" in the department or agency
receives a report it takes the conclusions of its bureaucratic colleagues
as fact and uses them as the starting point for its own work. Conse-
quently, most reports of government commissions are the result of
adding up the approximations of different bureaucratic groups and
then compromising between divergent interests. The result of this
process is a document which steers the reader away from understanding.
The President's Commission, as Edward Jay Epstein showed in In-
9. Government investigators recorded Mark Lane's public statements and ran interna.
tional security checks on his activities. See, e.g., Archives Files No. 44oss, L tter from
James J. Rowley, Chief U.S. Secret Service forwarding a tape recording of far, Lane's
press conference held in lobby of VFW Building. 200 Mfaryland Ave., N.E. on Februay
11, 1961; there is also a report by the FBI. withheld, prepared by Special Agent Benjamin
P. McManus entitled Mark Lane, February 3, 1964, New York City.
10. Harold Weisberg, whose books on the case have been seminal, has pointed out that
more effort seems to have been spent by the FBI in tracing critics of the Presldent's Com.
mission than in finding evidence concerning the events of November 22.25, 1953. Wins-
BM~, WHTE=WAs 11 (1965).
11. LAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 181.
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quest, was no exception to this method.1 2 The President's Commission
relied on the agencies of the government for information. It did not
examine them. 3 The Commission Report states it had no need to
employ investigators "because of the diligence, cooperation and facili-
ties of federal investigative agencies. . . ,,14 Commission members did
ask whether deviations in FBI reconstructions mattered, but they were
simply told they did not.15 They had no way of verifying this because
of their lack of independent investigators and their reliance on govern-
ment agencies.
Commissions are generally appointed in the area of national security,
as political instruments either against other departments of the govern-
ment, as punctuators of decisions and conclusions which already have
made, or as window dressing. In some cases government commissions
also have the high duty of not reporting or analyzing activities which
might endanger the state. Thus limitations are set for reasons of state.
So, for example, where there may be extensive covert government in-
volvement bearing on an event or series of events, one may be fairly
secure in surmising that the commission would be structured to avoid
analyzing that series of involvements if it would endanger "national
security." My conclusion is that for this reason an independent inves-
tigating staff was not employed. Such a group might have uncovered
a covert operation of the CIA in the payment of funds and resources to
refugee Cuban groups, some of whose members might be implicated
in the assassination. Furthermore, the theory is developed by Weisberg
in Whitewash 11 that the American government was involved in run-
ning guns and ammunition to Cuba with Jack Ruby acting as a point
of contact. To independent investigators it would have appeared that
the CIA was funding the President's assassins and that CIA involvement
with central characters in the assassination had to be covered up. But
12. EwYARD J. EPSTEIN, INQUEST (1966).
13. Schwartz, A Legal Demurrer to the Report of the Warren Commission 11 JOURNAL
OF FosrSC SCIENCES 318, 321 (1966). Under Executive Order No. 11130, Nov. 80, 1963,
the Commission was "to examine (emphasis added) the evidence developed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or
be uncovered by Federal or state authorities, to make such further investigation as the
Commission finds desirable." (Emphasis added.)
14. PRESIDENT'S CoAra'N REP'. xiii. Oswald was interrogated for 12 hours by more than
25 officials of the FBI, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police, the Sheriff, a U.S. Marshall
and Post Office Inspector and no record was kept. "For all of this combined effort no
stenographic record was maintained, no tape recording was created and the only partid.
pant who made any notes did not submit them to the Commission." LANE, op. Cit. supra
note 6, at 187. Such sloppy investigative techniques should have encouraged the Corn'
mission to employ its own investigators.
15. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, 5 HEAR-
INGS 163-64 (1964) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N HEARINGS].
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first, two minor matters which cast doubt on the reliability of the Com-
mission's theories must be discussed.
A. The Reconstructions
The critics have charged that the Commission's staff and the agencies
upon which they relied mishandled the evidence. The Commission
counsels' methods were hardly a field day for the best evidence rule.
Assume, as the case may be, that there was a disposition or even a posi-
tive direction to find that there was only a single assassin.Y' And suppose,
as is the case, that in the reconstruction of its parts, the Commission put
together a series of approximations each of which in and of itself was not
wrong, but was only approximate. The resulting error could be gross.
For example, the reconstruction of the assassination by the FBI occurred
early in the morning of May 24, 1964. What a person sees from a window
at 6:30 of a May morning is very different from what he sees at 12:30
on a November day. On November 22, the wind was blowing very
strongly. There is no indication that the same wind conditions held
during the reconstruction.1 7 There is now some evidence to suggest
that the kind of car President Kennedy sat in was significantly different
from the one used in the reconstruction."" According to Weisberg the
FBI may have assumed that the President was sitting perhaps as much
as 10 inches higher than he did on November 22.10 In the reconstruc-
tion, the only assumption was that the shots came from the 6th floor
of the Texas Book Depository. The car was lined up in such a way that
the person in the window had to see the car. "We moved the car around
until he (Mr. Frazier) told us from the window, viewed through the
rifle the point where he wanted the car to stop. And he was the one in
16. According to Lane, the Commission "assumed that the answer to that question
would be found by those investigating Oswald's activities on November 22. The frame-
work of the Commission's investigation appears to have precluded an), conclusion other
than the one that it ultimately reached." But in a telephone discussion on December 22.
1966, M'r. David Belin of the Commission staff told me that at no time did the)y assume
that Oswald was the assassin of Kennedy and the murderer of Tippit. He albo said that
they "took nothing for granted" on the question of whether there were one or more
assassins. This directly contradicts Lane's contention that the Commission and its staff
started from the assumption of Oswald's guilt and put the entire investigation into that
context. For further study of the case the 238-page Ball-Ilelin memorandum (The Deter-
mination of who was the Assassin of President Kennedy) should be made part of the
public record since it is the single most important document (at least that I have heard
of) which describes the Commission's investigation in its initial crucial stages. Further-
more, it is the one document which would show that the method of the Commission did
not start from the assumption of Oswald's guilt.
17. WELsERO, op. cit. supra note 10, at 175, citing 5 PaMsimnazr's Cost'n HEANucs 132.
18. Id. at 178.
19. Ibid. See also the testimony of Mr. Shaneyfelt of the FZL 5 PArsmar's Cors'i
HEARINGS 151.
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the window that told us where the point 'A' was. Once we established
that, we then photographed it."20
Of course one could not restage the entire assassination or series of
bizarre events which occurred between November 22 and November
24. But one could restage the events more convincingly than the Com-
mission did. For example, the Commission asked some of the best rifle-
men in the United States to repeat the shots of Oswald in conditions
far more favorable than those which Oswald would have been under
on November 22. Yet, shooting at a fixed target, they were unable to
repeat Oswald's shots within the allocated time, and Oswald's shots
were fired at a moving target. On the other hand, it seems to me that at
least one member of the Commission should have wondered why ex-
perts were used rather than average marksmen. And he should have
questioned the method used by the staff in proof of the case.
As the Report says, "three FBI firearm experts tested the rifle
the purpose of this experiment was not to test the rifle under conditions
which prevailed at the time of the assassination but to determine the
maximum speed at which it could be fired." (Emphasis added.)21 The
President's Commission should have reconstructed the events by having
an ex-marine of Oswald's approximate background, physical size and
marksman ability see whether he could recreate Oswald's alleged feat of
marksmanship. The Commission might then have asked that ex-marine
to perform within a 43 minute period Oswald's supposed subsequent
activities. The Commission now credits Oswald with doing extraordi-
nary things without showing that one man could do them. Between
12:33 and 1:16 Oswald is alleged to have shot the President and Gov-
ernor Connally, left the Book Depository, taken "a 7 block walk on Elm
Street, a bus ride toward the area he had just left, another walk to his
rooming house where he spent 3 or 4 minutes, a pause at a bus stop for
an unspecified length of time, a walk almost a mile long to the intersec-
tion of East 10th Street and Patton Avenue, and at last, the confronta-
tion and murder of Officer Tippit."
22
B. The Super Bullet
According to the President's Commission there were three shots fired
and three empty cartridge cases found on the 6th floor of the Deposi-
20. Testimony of Mr. Shaneyfelt, 5 PRESMENT'S COMM'N HEAuNcs 146.
21. Prs mENT'S Cohim'N REP. 194.
22. Lane argues that only by carefully selecting the "least competent and most fanciful"
testimony was it possible for the Commission to conclude that it had succeeded in recon-
structing every move that Oswald made. LANE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 159.
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tory.m One bullet could have hit the street. A fragment from that bullet
could have hit James T. Tague 4 on the cheek. Tague said that on the
street "there was a mark quite obviously that was a bullet, and it was
very fresh." 25 According to the Commission there was a second bullet
which seriously wounded both the President and the Governor, and
then a third bullet which killed the President.
The President's Commission report supports the single bullet theory
and implies that all members were in absolute agreement with it. Yet
Edward Jay Epstein in his book Inquest shows that there was a split
of 4-3 on this question among the Commission members.20 Those who
supported the single bullet theory were Chief Justice Warren, Allen
Dulles, John J. McCloy, and Gerald Ford while the southern mem-
bers of the Commission, Senator Russell, Congressman Boggs, and
Senator Cooper dissented. (It would not be a public disservice if
these three Commissioners would now state publicly why they dis-
agreed with the single bullet theory.) According to the original pro-
ponent of that theory, Arlen Specter, one does not have to accept
the single bullet theory to conclude that there was only one assassin.
But this can only be true if Oswald fired before the Commission
assumes that he did, at a brief instant which the Commission itself
ruled out. "For a fleeting instant, the President came back into view
in the telescopic lens at frame 186 [of the Zapruder film] as he appeared
in an opening among the leaves."27 If this possibility is ruled out then
the film leaves us with the conclusion that 1.8 seconds elapsed between
the first moment that the President could have been hit (about frame
207) and the final moment at which Connally was hit. As Esquire
magazine pointed out, "the bolt action of the murder rifle cannot
possibly have been fired twice during the time in which both men
were hit. Either both men were hit by the same bullet or there were
two assassins." 28
According to the Commission, bullet number 399 passed "between
two large muscles, produced a contusion on the upper part of the
pleural cavity (without penetrating the cavity), bruised the top portion
of the right lung and ripped the windpipe (trachea) in its path through
the President's neck."29 It then changed its direction from upward
28. PEsm'ENs CoM N REP. 8.
24. Id. at 116.
25. Ibid.
26. EpSrmN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 149-50.
27. PRESImENe's Comm'N REP. 101.
28. Esquire, Dec. 1966, p. 205.
29. PRsm's CoM N' REp. 88.
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to downward, passed through Connally's clothes, his back, "traversed
the Governor's chest in a downward angle, shattering his fifth rib,
and exited below the right nipple."80 It had deposited some fragments
in his chest, but it then entered his wrist and thigh, deposited some
fragments in his wrist (about three grains worth),3' and finally "a small
metallic fragment" which is still imbedded in the thigh. 2 But the bullet
which is reputed to have done all this damage lost remarkably little
weight. It was found on a stretcher in the Parkland Hospital. Its weight
was 158.6 grains; the FBI agent, Frazier, claimed that this kind of bullet
could not have weighed more than 161 grains. Furthermore, the bullet
was remarkably undeformed. Frazier pointed out the bullet was virtu-
ally clean with no marks, blood or material left on it.83 When the
Commission experts fired a bullet similar to Bullet 399, from a range
equal to Oswald's and causing only one of the wounds that 399 did (in
the wrist), the bullet was heavily distorted.
Dr. Alfred G. Olivier, the Chief of the Wounds Ballistics Branch at
Edgewood Arsenal testified about Bullet No. 853 which was fired
through a goat. "It went through the velocity screen into some cotton
waste, dropped out of the bottom of that and was lying on the floor."
After passing through the goat the weight of the bullet came to 158.8
grains. In other words it was almost the same weight as Bullet 399.
However, Dr. Olivier indicated that the amount "of goat tissue it
traversed was probably somewhat less than the Governor .. ,"4 Yet
the bullet was quite flattened. Furthermore it should be noted that
Bullet No. 853 would have had to pass through two goats to approxi-
mate the alleged path of Bullet 399 since it purportedly passed through
two people. Bullet 399 was not flattened. 5 Nowhere does the Commis-
sion explain how the bullet which tore the back of the President's skull
was broken into fragments while Bullet 399, which hit bones, tissue,
skin and muscle of two men, was not damaged.
30. Id. at 95.
31. 4 PRESIDENT'S COAwM'N HEARINGS 113.
32. PESIDENT'S COtM'N REP. 95.
33. 3 PRESIDENT'S Co.M'N HEARINGS 428-29.
34. 5 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N HEARINGs 80.
35. Exhibit 399, PRESMIDENT'S COMM'N REP. Colonel Fink, a leading pathologist,
testified against the theory that Bullet 399 could have passed through both persons, Yet
the ballistics expert stated that Bullet 399 could have passed through both the President
and the Governor. Chief Justice Warren asked Dr. Olivier whether the same bullet could
have "gone through the President's back as it did (sic), gone through Governor Connally's
chest as it did and then through his hand as it did."
Dr. Olivier: "It was certainly capable of doing all that."
The Chairman: "It was capable?"
Dr. Olivier: "Yes."
The Chairman: "The one shot?"
Dr. Olivier: "Yes."
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Governor Connally also dissents from the Commission's single bullet
theory. He stated to the Commission and in Life magazine that he was
not shot by the same bullet which passed through President Kennedy.
Although Governor Connally does not believe that shots came
from anywhere other than the Texas Book Depository, he and his
wife examined the Zapruder film and said: "They talk about the
'one bullet or two bullet theory'!" he continues, "but as far as I am
concerned there is no 'theory.' There is my absolute knowledge,
and Nellie's, too, that one bullet caused the President's first wound
and that an entirely separate shot struck me." "No one will ever
convince me otherwise," added Mrs. Connally. "It's a certainty,"
said the Governor, "I'll never change my mind."
The Governor concluded after seeing the Zapruder films again that he
was hit about one half second later than the Commission said he was
which is about frame 234 in the Zapruder film.30
In the final analysis the Commission experts split on the single bullet
theory. The pathologists whom the Commission relied on concluded
that it was "extremely unlikely" that Bullet 399 passed through both
the President and the Governor. Dr. Humes could not "conceive" that
the fragments found in Connally came from Bullet 399. 7 The ballistics
team, after prodding from counsel, seemed to think it was possible.=3
Reviewing the theories about the number of shots, the Commission's
single bullet hypothesis seems highly improbable. It is possible that a
fragment, or fragments, from the bullet which hit President Kennedy's
head could have hit Governor Connally's arm. Arlen Specter has
pointed out that there were substantial fragmentations from the bullet
which struck the President's head. If some of those fragments struck
Governor Connally it would explain the bullet's path more cogently.
In that case it would have then only passed through the chest and the
wrist. Yet this interpretation could still not explain the fact that Bullet
399 was virtually undeformed. Given the weight of Bullet 853 and its
flattened front, it is possible that Bullet 399 was fired once by the person
or group which might have planted it.
The history of the whereabouts of Bullet 399 is instructive. One
cannot conclude from the evidence with any degree of assurance where
the bullet came from, how it got where it was, and whether it was the
bullet that passed through the President and the Governor. Given the
36. Life, Nov. 25, 1966, pp. 45-48.
37. 2 Psm ENT's COAIM'N HEIaR.'s 375-76, 382.
58. PR~smErr's Combi'N REP. 107-09.
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alleged extraordinary exploits of that bullet, it is important to be
specific about its discovery. Arlen Specter stated, however, that "the hos-
pital attendants were not cognizant of the fact a bullet was about to drop
off a stretcher, and they didn't maintain a chain of evidence such as
would be highly desirable if we were to introduce matters in a Phila-
delphia criminal case."39
The Commission Report, noting that Governor Connally was moved
from a stretcher to an operating table, stated that:
A nearly whole bullet was found on Governor Connally's stretcher
at Parkland Hospital after the assassination.... Although Tomlin-
son (Parkland Hospital's senior engineer) was not certain whether
the bullet came from the Connally stretcher or the adjacent one,
the Commission has concluded that the bullet came from the
Governor's stretcher. That conclusion is buttressed by evidence
which eliminated President Kennedy's stretcher as a source of the
bullet. President Kennedy remained on the stretcher on which he
was carried into the hospital while the doctors tried to save his
life. He was never removed from the stretcher from the time he
was taken into the emergency room until his body was placed in a
casket in that same room. After the President's body was removed
from that stretcher, the linen was taken off and placed in a hamper
and the stretcher was pushed into trauma room No. 2, a completely
different location from the site where the whole bullet was
found.
40
But let us also trace the conclusion of the Commission that the bullet
was found on Connally's stretcher. If we assume that Mr. Tomlinson
gave the bullet to a Mr. Wright of the Parkland Hospital security staff
(something which is not found in the hearings), the following report is
relevant. A Secret Service agent, Special Agent Richard E. Johnson,
stated on November 30, 1963,41 "[d]uring this period a Mr. Wright from
the security staff [of the Parkland Hospital] came to me with an ex-
pended bullet and wished to turn it over to a Secret Service Agent.
The only information I was able to get from him prior to the de-
parture of Mrs. Kennedy and the casket was that the bullet had been
found on a stretcher which President Kennedy may have been placed
on." He also stated that he found rubber gloves, a stethoscope, and other
doctor's paraphernalia on this same stretcher. Although the Commis-
sion states that the bullet came from the stretcher that Governor
39. U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 10, 1966, p. 56 (interview with Arlen Specter).
40. PRESID NT'S COMM'N REP. 79-81.
41. Activities of Reporting Agent on Nov. 22, 1963, 18 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N HRAINGS
789-99. (Emphasis added.)
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Connally was on, testimony by Darrell Tomlinson neither supports nor
contradicts that conclusion. Indeed, he attempted mightily to escape
being pinned down on where the bullet came from.42
In the examination of R. J. Jimison, Mr. Specter asked about the
stretcher which supposedly had the bullet on it. Jimison was the orderly
who handled the stretcher on which Governor Connally was placed:
Mr. Specter: "Did you notice any bullets on the stretcher?"
Mr. Jimison: "I never noticed any at all."
4 3
On the other hand two nurses both testified that they did not notice
any bullet or other object on the stretcher of the President. They both
stated that the President's mattress was bare. The nearly undamaged
Bullet 399 may have been planted on the stretcher at the Parkland
Hospital. If there was a second assassin it is hard to believe that only
two people were involved since it is highly unlikely that one of the
assassins went to the hospital to plant the bullet on the day of the
assassination. However, the FBI report on the autopsy states that the
bullet simply fell out of the President's body."4 Still, a second assassin
is probable because the bolt action on the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle
could not have been fired in less than two seconds. These are hard and
stubborn issues that cannot be glossed over.
Those who do not accept the single bullet theory introduce as
supporting evidence the large number of witnesses who claim that they
thought shots came from the grassy knoll area. Lane says that 58 wit-
nesses state that "shots came from the direction of the grassy knoll and
not from the Book Depository building, while 32 disagreed."'4 Ram-
parts estimates that 64 witnesses state that they heard shots or saw
smoke coming from the grassy knoll.40 No doubt the information
supplied by witnesses on the basis of sound or seeing smoke is open to
question, but enough testified or deposed that that is where they
thought the shots came from to leave the impression that the Com-
mission overstated its case when it said that there was "no credible
evidence that any shots were fired from anywhere else" than the
Depository.47
If any weight is to be given to contemporaneous reactions, it should
be noted that the first reaction of policemen was to move toward the
42. 2 PxsmET's Comi'N HEARNGS 18-40.
43. 6 P.Fs.DNrT's Com'N HEAMNGS 127.
44. FBI, StrmARy REPoRT pt. 2, at 18 (Dec. 9, 19653).
45. LANF, op. cit. supra note 6. at 37.
46. David Welsh and David Lifton, The Third Assassin, Ramparts, Jan. 1967, pp. 93-98.
47. PRESENf's CoMM'N REP. 71.
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grassy knoll. Many -witnesses reacted as if that was the place from which
the shots were fired: "Two tried to ride their motorcycles up the
incline on the knoll."
48
David Welsh and David Lifton in arguing for a third assassin de-
veloped the theory that the shot from the grassy knoll would explain
why the President's head was thrust backward when hit by the bullet.49
This was not explained in the Commission Report. Barring a neuro-
muscular reaction the head of a person will travel in the direction
which the bullet hitting it is travelling. Newton's second law of motion
contradicts the theory that all the shots came from the Texas Book
Depository-in back of the car. That may not be evidence, but it does
raise a serious question.
Was There a Conspiracy? A Hypothesis
The Commission stated that there was no credible evidence of a
conspiracy. But it seems to me that it did not follow the clues which
might have proved that such a conspiracy existed. Critics of the Report
and the Commission staff's work state that there is enough data to
advance a conspiratorial theory of the assassination. Sauvage, Popkin,
Weisberg, and Lane all point to occurrences in which "Oswald" was
seen where the Commission states he could not have been. But the
Commission did not investigate the question of whether someone was
attempting to pass himself off as Oswald. For example, Oswald was
reportedly seen practicing with a rifle hitting bull's eyes, displaying
uncommon skill on a rifle range on November 16, 17, 20 and 21.80 He
was seen attempting to cash a check for $189 at a grocery store in Irving,
Texas on November 13, with his wife and family in the car.' There is
also evidence that Oswald shopped for a car and drove a car with a car
salesman, Albert Bogard, although the Commission pointed out Oswald
did not drive. There was someone named Oswald who had three holes
drilled into the rifle at a sports shop in Irving, Texas in early No-
vember.52 Oswald's rifle had two holes. But the most interesting evi-
dence of another Oswald was given by Mrs. Sylvia Odio. She said that
on either September 27 or 28, 1963 Oswald and two other people came
to see her. They were interested in financing and advancing anti-Castro
48. Welsh and Lifton, supra note 46, at 88.
49. Id. at 89.
50. 10 PRESIDENT'S COAM'N HEARINGS 370-72, 380.
51. RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE SECOND OSwALD 84 (1965).
52. Id. at 522-23.
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operations5 3 as part of an anti-Castro group. Weisberg quotes the Com-
mission Report against itself54 to establish that at that meeting there
must have been another person posing as Oswald. This in itself would
not be as important as some critics have thought except that Mrs. Odio
was called by "Leopoldo," one of the Cubans, who asked Mrs. Odio
what she thought of "the American." After Mrs. Odio replied in a
guarded manner, Leopoldo said: "You know our idea is to introduce
him to the underground in Cuba, because he is great, he is kind of
nuts.... He told us we don't have any guts, you Cubans, because Presi-
dent Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and
some Cubans should have done that.... And he said, it is so easy to do
it. He has told us."55 According to the Commission Report the FBI
located Loran Eugene Hall, a participant in anti-Castro activities, who
said he had visited Mrs. Odio with Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-
American from East Los Angeles, and one William Seymour from
Arizona. "WVhile the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into
this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has
concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment
in September of 1963." But Lane points out that both Seymour and
Howard deny visiting Mrs. Odio. Of course Epstein points out that by
the third week in September of 1964 the Commission wanted to get the
Report out. During that September there were a number of uncon-
firmed rumors in Washington that the White House was very insistent
that the Report be finished and presented to the public well before
election day.
In the frantic wrapping-up days of the Report for the Commission
there appeared to be real doubts on the part of the Commission staff,
but those doubts seemed to be too easily allayed by the FBI Report
that Lee Harvey Oswald did not visit Mrs. Odio. According to the
Commission, at almost the same time that a group of people (one of
whom used the name Oswald) were seeing Mrs. Odio, the alleged assas-
sin Oswald was in New Orleans performing in a most extraordinary way.
He was arrested for passing out literature of the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee, he had a mock fight with a pro-Batistiano, Carlos Brin-
guier, and he established himself as an anti-Communist and anti-
Castroite with Bringuier's friend. 6 Furthermore, Weisberg points out
that Oswald was carrying in his wallet at the time of the arrest names
53. PxsENf's CommN REP. 321-34; 11 Pasmr's Coirt' Hu ~c.s 367-89.
54. "WEIVl., WHmSmITAS I (1965).
55. Poprm , op. cit. supra note 51, at 100; 11 PRESIDENTS COM.I'N HEAINcs 372.
56. 10 PRasmmifs COmM'N H.AmNGS 34-38.
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of people in the Soviet Union and other references to his residence in
the Soviet Union.57 It is possible that Oswald was confused, had a death
wish, and was deranged. It is possible that Oswald did not know what lie
was doing. Perhaps he wanted to get caught. Yet nagging doubt persists
and is supported by the fact that things went much too easily for him
at the New Orleans police station. Bringuier, who was arrested with
Oswald, said that Oswald received special treatment from the police
and indeed the FBI. This suggests the possibility that Oswald was in-
volved with either the New Orleans police or the FBI. To contend
seriously with this possibility, the Commission should have indepen-
dently cross-checked what happened in New Orleans. 8 Since the Com-
mission's style was to rely on the police agencies, it did not cross-check
Bringuier.
There is another question which perhaps relates to this series of
bizarre coincidences. According to Mrs. Nancy Perrin Rich, she and
her husband were at a meeting in which Jack Ruby was involved. At
that meeting there was an unnamed colonel, a crewcut lad, a Dave C.-
"I think it was Cole, but I wouldn't be sure. Dave came to my husband
with a proposition. '"59 That proposition was to take Cuban refugees out
of Cuba and run guns into that country. According to Mrs. Rich the
plan was called off after she asked for $25,000.
The reason that this issue is important is that the Commission did
not try to follow up the mysterious colonel. The FBI found Mr. Dave
Cherry who denied being involved. That report was a page long 0 The
examination of the police agencies in this matter seems to be lax, to
say the least. Why should that be? One explanation is that they were
rushed. Another is that some of the police agencies feared the political
consequences of exposure of their activities.
During the period 1960-1963, the United States, through the CIA,
strongly insinuated itself in the Cuban situation by financing invasion
plans, cadres in exile, and miniature armies. But by November, 1963,
there was a clear d~marche-at least on the part of President Kennedy.
In a speech on November 18, 1963, before the Inter-American Press
57. WEISBERG, op. cit. supra note 10, at 62-64.
58. But this is a long way from proving that the same group with which Oswald seemed
to be involved in New Orleans was connected to the group of people which made noises
about killing the President. Furthermore, it should be noted that at any one time there
are probably a number of groups or individuals who talk about killing the President, That
does not mean that they are involved, in fact, with either an individual or those who might
actually plan and execute an assassination. The links are missing between the New Or-
leans and Dallas Cuban groups.
59. LANE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 290.
60. WEISBERG, op. cit. supra note 10, at 69.
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Association, President Kennedy extended the "hand of friendship and
assistance" to the Cubans once they would stop being an agent of
"foreign imperialism" (that is, the Soviet Union). This was the only
thing, according to Theodore Sorensen, which "prevented normal
relations." In a sense this speech seemed to mark the end of blatant U.S.
subversion in Cuba. According to Sorensen these remarks were "little
noticed. But Kennedy hoped to expand this theme in future speeches,
to spell out to the Cuban people the freedoms, the hemispheric recogni-
tion and the American aid which would be forthcoming once they
broke with Moscow."' B1
That speech must have been noticed by the Cuban exile groups and
marked as the culmination of a policy toward Cuba which had been
changing since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. To the militants it
must have sounded like the final blow to their chances of receiving
American support for a political and military take-over of Cuba.
From the time of the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy had
agreed to a hands-off military policy against Cuba. That was part of the
quid pro quo between the Soviet Union and the United States for
ending the crisis. Indeed in 1963 the United States began cracking
down on various Cuban refugee groups which got out of hand.
The assassination of the President cannot be understood unless it is
tested against this political backdrop of American confrontation with
Cuba and the evolution of Kennedy's policy toward the refugee groups.
My surmise is that the CIA was heavily involved with a number of the
individuals who are talked about in the hearings but who somehow
appear only as shadowy characters. The CIA in this context is like the
puppeteer without sufficient wire to control his puppets. For example,
Manola (Manuel) Ray's JURE and the Cuban Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front were funded by the CIA as were other exile groups men-
tioned in the report. It does not stretch the evidence to suggest that
the animus against the President was very great among groups the CIA
funded, but did not control, and that some of their minions took
revenge, either using Oswald as scapegoat or including him as part
of the plot. If this is true, or if the CIA thought that it might be true, it
would explain the Commission's exclusive reliance on the official
federal police agencies and its failure to cross-examine them or set up
an independent investigative group. After all, the task of the Com-
mission was "to make nice," not to dismantle the national security
state apparatus, because it might have funded people over whom it had
61. THEoDoRE SowREsEN, KENrmy 723 (1966).
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no control. The involvement of larger groups such as Cuban exiles
would begin to explain the incredible number of mysterious deaths of
persons tangentially implicated in the assassination. 2 It would begin
to make sense of the Commission's recommendation. The Commis-
sion stated that it had "the impression that too much emphasis is
placed by both [the FBI and the Secret Service] on the investigation
of specific threats by individuals and not enough on dangers from other
sources."' 3 It would begin to explain the Commission's recommenda-
tion that the police agencies of the American government enter into
written agreements with each other and with other agencies, both
federal and local, on the kinds of information they want. "This is
especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA, which carry the
major responsibility for supplying information about potential threats,
particularly those arising from organized groups, within their special
jurisdiction. Since these agencies are already obliged constantly to
evaluate the activities of such groups, they should be responsible for
advising the Secret Service if information develops indicating the
existence of an assassination plot and for reporting such events as a
change in leadership or dogma which indicate that the group may
represent a danger to the President. Detailed formal agreements em-
bodying these arrangements should be worked out between the Secret
Service and both of these agencies."0 4 The Commission's statement was
without question a specific warning to the President which said that
agencies such as the CIA had better begin reporting to the White
House and the National Security Council when groups funded by them
suddenly represent a danger to the President.
Should There be a New Investigation?
In 1966 the criticisms of the Commission's report have led to de-
mands for a new investigation. Because the issue of re-opening the
President's Commission may become an intense political issue in 1967
it is well to review some of the alternatives.
Alternative I. Some contend that a new investigation would uncover
nothing new. The job done by the President's Commission, they argue,
was fair and judicious and it is the best that can be done. Questions
will always remain, just as they have remained about the assassination
62. Welsh, The Legacy of Penn Jones, Jr., Ramparts, Nov., 1966, p. 39.
63. PREsIDENT'S ComM'N REP. 458. (Emphasis added.)
64. Id. at 463. (Emphasis added.)
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of President Lincoln and other great events in American history. These
questions may be interesting for the pedant and aficionado, but that is
all and that is the way it should be kept.
Alternative II. Many have urged that the President's Commission
should be reconvened to study the charges made by the critics and to
answer those charges, if it can. Where it cannot answer them it should
undertake a new investigation. Thus, it should re-examine the single
bullet theory and the autopsy reports, for example, in the light of the
critics' charges.
Alternative III. On September 28, 1966 Congressman Kupferman
introduced a resolution (reintroduced in the 90th Session of Congress)
which seeks to establish a Joint Committee to Determine the Necessity
of a Congressional Investigation of the Assassination. The Committee
would be a bi-partisan group comprised of 5 Congressmen and 5
Senators. If, after a preliminary review of all the documents, working
papers and reports, and other data surrounding the assassination, it is
found that a new investigation was necessary, it would have the power
to continue its investigation "and upon completion of its investigation
[shall] report its findings to the Senate and to the House of Representa-
tives." (H. R. Cong. Res. 1023) Congressman Kupferman had in mind
as precedent the Joint Congressional Committee which reviewed Pearl
Harbor and the findings of the Roberts Commission four years later.
Alternative IV. Perhaps two investigations are called for. The first
would examine the events themselves, and the second would review the
work of police agencies and others connected with the case to ascertain
whether there was a cover-up. The Kupferman resolution should in-
clude a provision for a Board of Inspectors to judge and oversee the
Joint Committee's work. The purpose of such a Board of Inspectors
implies that it should be composed of persons other than public officials
since it appears that those who have lived their lives in the Establish-
ment's womb are dubious candidates to do a creditable job when truth
is at stake. I would add one other provision which would require an
investigation of the activities of the CIA and the FBI as they relate to
the President's assassination and the subsequent investigation. Let us
hope that in any new national investigation Oswald's interests will be
protected and the people's right to know who killed their leader will
be held paramount.
MARcus RASKIN -
- Co-Director, Institute for Policy Studies. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1957, University of Chicago.
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Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence
Without Trial. By Donald J. Newman. Boston: Little,
Brown 8 Co., 1966. Pp. xxvii, 259. $8.50.
A few years ago, I represented a defendant charged with wilfully
delivering his passport for use by another person, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1544.1 My client was in his early twenties, married to a Ger-
man girl of like age, and the father of an infant child of the marriage.
Musical and bookish in a desultory way, he had been living with his
wife and studying philosophy in Amsterdam, Holland. One Friday they
were visited by two friends from Berlin-a private first class who played
the clarinet in an Army band there, and his German fiancee. The
private's leave was to expire on Sunday, and he had planned to drive on
Saturday in his fiancee's Volkswagen to Helmstedt (on the East-West
German border and the usual point of entry to East Germany for
transit traffic to Berlin), and proceed from there to Berlin by the
regular military "duty" train from Frankfurt to Berlin, scheduled to
pass through Helmstedt shortly after midnight and arrive in Berlin
Sunday morning. At that time, United States military personnel were
forbidden to use private transport from West Germany to Berlin.
The reunion in Amsterdam was convivial and protracted, and by
mid-afternoon on Saturday it became apparent that the Army private
and his fiancee might not be able to reach Helmstedt in time to catch
the train to Berlin. Fearful of being AWOL, the private (who was in
civilian clothes) asked my client for the loan of the latter's passport, so
that if the train had left Helmstedt, the private could go on to Berlin
via the autobahn in his fianc~e's car, using the passport to clear the
military check-points at the zonal border.
Most unwisely, my client turned the passport over to his friend, who
then took off eastward. Upon arrival at Helmstedt, without checking on
the train (which in fact had not yet departed), the couple drove on to
the East German check point, and the private displayed the passport in
the hope of being passed through as a civilian. The Russian border
guard readily detected the ruse and, after brief questioning, turned the
travelers back to the American check point, where the passport was
confiscated by the military police.
1. The relevent portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (1964) provides that:
Whoever wilfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or delivers a passport to any
person, for use by another than the person for whose use it was originally Issued
and designed-shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
598
Vol. 76: 568, 1967
Book Reviews
Apprised of the fate of his passport by a letter from his friend's
fiancee, my client reported the matter to the American consulate in
Amsterdam. Eventually he was issued a new passport valid only for
travel to the United States and, when he did return, the passport was
taken from him. Shortly thereafter he was indicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1544 for knowingly and wilfully delivering his passport to and for
the use of the Army clarinetist.
2
It seemed clear enough that my client was guilty as charged. But his
offense had no subversive aspect, and his intentions had been benevo-
lent if misguided; a felony rap would certainly be a very stiff penalty
for what he had done. In view of his youth, family responsibilities, and
good record and reputation, the case appeared to be one in which a
properly contrite approach to the prosecuting authorities might well
win a reduction of the charge, if not its outright dismissal.
Much to my surprise, the United States Attorney was adamant, ap-
parently because of pressure from the State Department to "make an
example" of my client. I had no alternative but to prepare for trial,
but took the precaution of looking for a lesser offense to which a
guilty plea might be offered if opportunity arose. It was not an easy
search; there seemed to be no misdemeanor in the federal penal code
that bore any relation to the charge. In the end I could find nothing
closer than the statute which had furnished the basis for the Japanese
exclusion cases,3 and which had been lying dormant since the Second
World War. This act made it a misdemeanor to enter "contrary to the
restrictions applicable thereto" any "military zone" established under
executive authority.4 Conceivably this could be stretched to cover the
Army private's entry into the Russian zone of Germany contrary to
the regulations requiring that he use military transportation, in which
case my client would be guilty as a principal for aiding and abetting
3
by loaning the passport.
2. The case was tried in the Eastern District of New York in 1962. My client landed
at Idlewild, which is in the Eastern District; 18 U.S.C. § 3238 provides that the trial of
offenses committed outside the United States shall be held in the district where the
offender is found.
3. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214 (1944).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1383 (1964):
Whoever, contrary to the restrictions applicable thereto, enters, remains in, leaves,
or commits any act in any military area or zone prescribed under the authority of
an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of the Army, or by any milt.tary commander designated by the Secretary of the Army, shall, if It appears that
he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or
order and that his act was in violation thereof, be fined not more than $5,00D or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964): "Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal ...
and punishable as such."
599
The Yale Law Journal
At the trial, the prosecution called the former Army private' as its
first witness. As the facts emerged the judge grew noticeably impatient,
and soon recessed the court and called counsel to chambers, where lie
sharply inquired whether the United States Attorney had nothing bet-
ter to do with his time and staff than to harass a silly boy who had
tried to do his friend a good turn. The Attorney spoke of State De-
partment pressure; the judge replied that the pressure was no excuse
for putting a felony conviction on the boy's record. Opportunity
knocked; I produced 18 U.S.C. § 1383, and offered to plead my client
guilty. The judge seized the idea almost greedily, and made it more
than clear to the Attorney that this was how things ought to be. The
jury was discharged, the Attorney brought in a superseding informa-
tion based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1383, my client pleaded guilty, and
the judge suspended sentence and put him on probation for one day.
This little case embodied several of the problems which form the
subject matter of Professor Newman's book. Plea bargaining between
defense and prosecution-unsuccessful in this instance-is, as the
author puts it,7 a "major characteristic of non-trial adjudication";
nevertheless, its propriety is by no means universally acknowledged.
Despite my client's clear guilt under a statute duly enacted by Con-
gress, the trial judge intervened to prevent the felony conviction which
the law prescribed as the penalty. Is such nullification a legitimate
judicial function? Joining in this process, I encouraged my client to
plead guilty to an offense of which he was very likely not guilty8 in
order to escape conviction of the offense which he had in fact com-
mitted. In this there was nothing very unusual, but accepted prac-
tice is not necessarily good.
Inasmuch as Professor Newman covers the field of criminal adjudica-
tion without trial and has included a large amount of material on
judge-directed acquittals, it is a bit puzzling that he selected the word
"conviction" as the main title.0 The book is the second in the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation series on the administration of criminal justice. 10
6. He had, meanwhile, been court-martialed and discharged from the service and
returned (married, I am happy to say, to his former fiancee) to the United States,
7. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETEPIINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE rITrou TRIAL
237 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEwMAN].
8. It is at least questionable that East Germany is a "military area or zone" within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1383, and it would be a good bet that my case Is the only
instance of this statute's application since the Second World War cases.
9. The Introduction (NEWMAN 3) is entitled Conviction and Acquittal with Trial in
Current Criminal justice Administration, which is a fair statement of the book's subject.
10. The first in the series is LAFAvE, ARRsr. THE DECISION ro TAKE A SuBJEr INTO
CusrODY (1965), and other works in the series, according to the Editor's Foreword (NEWMAN
xiii), will cover "detection of crime," "prosecution," and "sentencing."
600
Vol. 76: 568, 1967
Book Reviews
The author is Professor of Social Work at the University of Wisconsin;
he has specialized in criminology and (in collaboration with the law
faculty) taught criminal law and administration at the Law School.
The book is divided into six parts, sixteen chapters, and numerous
subdivisions. Part I is concerned with the accuracy and fairness of
convictions based on guilty pleas. Parts II and IH deal with reduced
charges and lenient sentences brought about by overt negotiations,
"implicit bargains," or traditional practice in the particular court.
Part IV examines the exercise of judicial discretion to acquit the guilty
for compassionate or other reasons relating to the defendant, and
Part V deals with judge-directed acquittals or charge reductions in
furtherance of general policy objectives, such as the correction of
police enforcement methods. Part VI analyzes the role of defense
counsel in nontrial criminal adjudication.
Unquestionably Professor Newman and the Bar Foundation have
done the legal profession a service in focusing attention upon an as-
pect of criminal justice which has been-to use an overworked phrase
-of low visibility. Exclusive preoccupation with trial problems seems
indefensible when one is reminded that over 90 per cent of all criminal
convictions, and over 70 per cent of all felony convictions, are based
on guilty pleas."
Despite the manifest care and scrupulous objectivity with which
this study has been presented, to me it is unsatisfactory in several
respects. For one thing, it is annoyingly over-organized; there are 1-35
headings of one or another sort in less than twice that many pages.
If this were merely a surfeit of subdivisions the fault would be minor.
But the author has proceeded on the basis that if a given illustration,
observation, or comparison logically falls within more than one sub-
division, it will be put under both or all of them. In consequence the
book is maddeningly repetitive. Time and again we read that in Mich-
igan a charge of armed robbery can be reduced by a guilty plea to
one of unarmed robbery; that the sale of narcotics carries a mandatory
tnventy-year sentence which the judges dislike and routinely reduce
to a charge of narcotics possession; that breaking and entering in the
nighttime almost invariably is lowered to breaking and entering by
day, even if the crime concededly occurred at night.' In his anxiety
to drive his lesson home, the author has gone well beyond the old
11. Nawmv 3.
12. Id. at 42, 53-54, 99, 177.
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newspapermen's rule for writing: Tell 'em what you're going to tell
'em, then tell 'em, and then tell 'em what you've told 'em.
Then there is the question of the sampling base's adequacy. The
text is based on "pilot fieldwork . . . undertaken in Michigan, Wis-
consin, and Kansas in 1956 and 1957." 13 Perhaps things have not
changed much in the intervening decade, but why these three states?
They are certainly not a distributive sample geographically or demo-
graphically. It may be that there were good and sufficient reasons for
the selection (Wisconsin is Professor Newman's base of operations),
but if so, they are not to be found in the book, which contains not one
word of explanation or justification.
Other technical criticism might be voiced,1 4 but its greatest short-
comings are substantive: over-reliance on the results of the field study,
insufficient range of comparison and illustration, and a disappointing
stinginesss of both analysis and value-judgment. In consequence the
book, albeit informative, is arid.
A twelve-page conclusion is devoted to "important unresolved is-
sues" disclosed by the preceding chapters. The author finds five such. 12
Should the guilty plea procedure be made "more formal and more
consistently focused on the factual basis of the plea"? Without saying
so explicitly, Professor Newman suggests an affirmative answer by
stressing the trend in all three of the studied states to scrutinize guilty
pleas more carefully, both by questioning at the arraignment and by
pre-sentence investigations. Should the trial judge have "administrative
responsibility for the over-all criminal justice system"? The author
points to the exclusionary rules'0 as examples of attempted court con-
trol of police methods, and to charge-juggling and circumstantial ac-
quittals of the guilty as illustrating court control of the correctional
process. But he hazards no opinion on the value or legitimacy of these
practices. Is "bargaining for guilty pleas.., a proper form of criminal
justice administration"? Whether proper or improper Professor New-
man does not say, but he pretty clearly regards it as inevitable. To
what extent should trial judges have discretion to acquit guilty de-
fendants? The question is not answered, but between the lines one
may perhaps sense a tentative approval, and he cites the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code authorizing the dismissal of crim-
13. Id. at ix.
14. The book lacks a bibliography, which seems to me an unfortunate omission In a
primarily informative study.
15. NEWMAN 231-43.
16. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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inal prosecutions on de minimis or extenuating grounds.'7 To what
extent can defense counsel "make significant contributions to the non-
trial conviction process"? Here at last and at least Professor Newman
has an answer. Defense counsel can and should contribute significantly,
but most of them are preoccupied with trials and "lack the knowledge
and skills" necessary to participate effectively in the "guilty plea sys-
tem."
Underlying all these questions, it seems to me, is one more general
and fundamental: to what extent should criminal adjudication with-
out trial be governed by statute and court rules? The intrinsic im-
portance of this area of the criminal process Professor Newman has
abundantly demonstrated, and-assuming his three chosen states are
at all representative-it is clear that in this area criminal practice has
grown like Topsy, and changed in unarticulated response to strong
but often submerged currents and pressures. Is this good, bad, or a
mixture of both?
Rereading the book against this issue, one wishes that Professor
Newman as author had stuck to his practice, as pedagogue, of collabora-
tion with a lawyer. What have the legislatures of Kansas, Michigan
and Wisconsin done to control nontrial criminal practice by statute?
What have the judges done by formal opinions or court rules? Scat-
tered through the book are a number of references to case or statutory
material, but nowhere is this material brought together or synthesized.
The Ford Foundation financed the field work on which the book is
based;"" it would have required no such magnificent resources to turn
a few law students loose in the digests and state codes, and produce a
nation-wide survey of what has been done, by courts and legislatures,
to regulate and formalize the nontrial procedures.
Against the background of what is on the books, the field study of
what happens in real life would have taken on an added and signifi-
cant dimension, and might have brought us measurably closer to a
judgment of what, if anything, needs to be done. Everyone assumes,
and probably rightly, that prosecutorial discretion to reduce or dis-
miss charges or recommend leniency, judicial discretion to acquit or
suspend sentence, and the defendant's avenue of escape from harsher
fate via a "copped plea" are the oil that lubricates the machinery of
justice. The criminal process is difficult and imprecise at best, and
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
18. NEWMAN IX.
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those who conduct it need plenty of elbow room for even "rough"
justice.
In all probability, accordingly, extensive regulation of nontrial pro-
ceedings, whether by statute, court rule, or appellate decision, would
destroy or endanger the very values that flow from the informality of
the process. It does not follow, however, that the changing nature of
nontrial proceedings should remain obscure, and it is Professor New-
man's awareness of and emphasis on this factor that is the most im-
portant feature of his book. It is, I think, regrettable that caution or
modesty have caused him to grasp less than he could have reached,
but he has given us a new and useful view of the criminal process, and
that is no mean achievement.
TELFORD TAYLORj
Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence
Without Trial. By Donald J. Newman. Boston: Little,
Brown 8& Co., 1966. Pp. xxvii, 259. $8.50.
Even the prosecutor worries about convicting the innocent. Deeply
ingrained in our criminal jurisprudence is the simple principle that
it is better to acquit nine guilty men than to convict one innocent
person. While the prosecutor would like to improve those odds by
convicting more of the guilty, he still pauses with concern over fast
procedures which may cut the corners of justice in the name of ad-
ministrative convenience. After noting Professor Newman's conclusion
on page 66 that conviction of the innocent is no more frequent on
the guilty plea than after trial, this prosecutor read the final 177 pages
in a more relaxed frame of mind.
The in-depth analysis of the processes of criminal law administra-
tion, undertaken by the American Bar Foundation, is obviously com-
mendable. More attention needs to be given to what actually occurs
in the pit of our trial courts as distinguished from the lofty general-
izations which rise from the refinements of appellate decisions. From
that point of view, Professor Newman's work is a significant step for-
ward. His treatment of plea bargaining is sufficiently fundamental for
the novice and sophisticated enough to cause the experienced prose-
- Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1928, Williams College; LL.B. 1932,
Harvard University.
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cutor to reflect on prior practices and re-examine current policies.
In what is perhaps an effort to make each section stand on its own,
Professor Newman has been unduly repetitive on many subjects.
While many writers de-emphasize the practical facts and concentrate
only on social policy, Professor Newman has done the opposite with
the unfortunate result that the policy considerations have been left
almost untouched. He stopped short of the critical issue: Is plea
bargaining proper? He identifies that issue as "a major unresolved
question"' and implies that it is proper because of its prevalence, but
he never comes to grips with its basic battle lines.
Before commenting on the policy issues, some differing experience
on the importance of plea bargaining should be noted. I would not
disagree with the elaborately footnoted statistics that, in general,
roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are guilty pleas,
2 or with
Professor Newman's conclusion that plea bargaining accounts for
many of those convictions.
But the Philadelphia story is much different. In Philadelphia, fewer
convictions are obtained through guilty pleas, and the bargained
plea is not extensively used. In 1965, slightly less than 27 per cent of
convictions in Philadelphia resulted from the guilty plea.3 This smaller
number of guilty pleas is probably not due to the lesser prowess of
the District Attorney or to the greater skill of the Philadelphia defense
lawyer, but rather to the tradition of expediting the disposition of
cases by a high percentage of trials before a judge alone on waiver of
the right of jury trial. In 1965 only 1.1 per cent of criminal cases were
tried to a jury in Philadelphia.4 With jury trial waived, a judge can try
as many as a dozen routine cases in a day. These procedures may elimi-
nate the practical necessity of plea bargaining which is prevalent in
some jurisdictions where a not guilty plea results in a lengthy jury
trial. The Philadelphia experience, however, supports Professor New-
man's conclusion that court machinery cannot accommodate a high
percentage of jury trials.
The smaller percentage of guilty pleas in Philadelphia is the
initial indicator that there is less plea bargaining here than in other
jurisdictions. My review of the daily trial sheets for hundreds of
court days shows relatively little plea bargaining. The Pennsylvania
1. NEWMAN, CONVICrION: THE DEnaMINATION OF GUILT OR INNoCE WmIHour TIIAL
237 (1966) [hereinafter dted as CONVIcTnoN].
2. CONIGION 3.
3. Statistics compiled by the Clerk of Quarter Sessions Court of Phuadelhia.
4. Statistics compiled by the Office of Court Administrator of PhiladelphI.
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Penal Code contains few provisions on mandatory sentences. Where
present in the narcotics laws, the courts have injected elasticity by
findings of guilty on possession instead of sale, or sometimes the
mandatory sentence provisions are simply ignored. Plea bargaining
occurs occasionally where a guilty plea will be entered to operating
a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner with a nol pros on
larceny of an automobile. In such cases, the facts would support con-
viction on either charge with the essential difference being in the intent
of the defendant to retain permanent possession of the automobile. The
semblance of plea bargaining is also present where a guilty plea is
entered to larceny with a nol pros of a burglary bill where the only
evidence of burglary is the tenuous inference arising from possession of
property which was recently taken from burglarized premises. Even
these situations do not occur with frequency.
In Philadelphia the major use of what could be categorized as plea
bargaining occurs in homicide cases. Many such cases involve a
factual situation indicating "variable guilt." The dictum that "[j]us-
tice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter" does not
fit the realities of a typical barroom killing of which there are, un-
fortunately, many in Philadelphia and elsewhere.5 Contrary to Judge
Rives' statement of high principle, justice does not readily flow from
a computer where the survivor of a fight and witnesses at the taproom
relate stories which indicate, in variable quantities, the facts of in-
toxication, provocation, malice aforethought and self-defense.
There is ordinarily sufficient evidence of malice and deliberation
in such cases for the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree, which carries either life imprisonment or death in
the electric chair. Or, the conceded drinking by the defendant may be
sufficient to nullify specific intent or malice to make the case second
degree murder, which calls for a maximum of 10 to 20 years in jail.
From all the prosecutor knows by the time the cold carbon copies of
the police reports reach the District Attorney's office, the defendant
may have acted in "hot blood", which makes the offense only voluntary
manslaughter with a maximum penalty of 6 to 12 years. And, the
defense invariably produces testimony showing that the killing was
pure self-defense.
When such cases are submitted to juries, a variety of verdicts are
returned, which leads to the inescapable conclusion of variable guilt.
5. Judge Rives in Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Most of those trials result in convictions for second degree murder or
voluntary manslaughter. The judges generally impose sentences with
a minimum range of 5 to 8 years and a maximum of 10 to 20 years.
That distilled experience enables the assistant district attorney and
the defense lawyer to bargain on the middle ground of what ex-
perience has shown to be "justice" without the defense running the
risk of the occasional first degree conviction which carries a manda-
tory minimum of life imprisonment and without the Commonwealth
tying up a jury room for 3 to 5 days and running the risk of acquittal.
Plea bargaining in Pennsylvania on such cases is explained not only
because of the concept of variable guilt, but also because our statute
prohibits a waiver of a jury trial on a murder bill of indictment. If our
procedures permitted a waiver of a jury on a second degree murder
bill in such cases, it is probable that even more of these cases would
be disposed of without plea bargaining.
Based on my experience in plea bargaining and the materials in
Professor Newman's book, I would answer his "major unresolved
question" by unequivocally stating that plea bargaining is proper
providing that the procedural standards detailed in his book are met.
In reaching that conclusion, I would place relatively little emphasis on
the administrative convenience of the judicial system. Our Phila-
delphia experience shows that our trial lists can be managed without
plea bargaining. I would summarily reject the plausible but imprecise
postulate that "[j]ustice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining
and barter." Professor Newman comprehensively identifies the enor-
mous discretion at work in criminal law at all levels. That shows a
spirit of "accommodation" which means much the same although it
sounds more polite than "bargaining and barter." Professor Newman
realistically identifies the discretion of the police officer who may
decide not to take a suspect into custody. The very broad discretion
of the prosecutor has been recognized by decades of judicial decisions.
In one of his best sections, Professor Newman candidly convicts the
courts for acquitting the guilty. But the courts have acquitted the
guilty for a variety of civilized reasons just as such discretion is in-
jected into law enforcement processes at every level. Such experience
is convincing that such compromise is socially desirable.
From the defendant's view such "accommodation" frequently makes
sense so long as the innocent are not convicted. An indispensable in-
gredient of plea bargaining is the defendant's representation by counsel
who provides the practical assurance that an innocent man will not
stand convicted. The strategic position of the defendant is often never
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better than before the state's witnesses have been heard at trial. Police
reports (unlike verbose book reviews) are often terse and frequently
omit unsavory facts which are developed at trial when the police officer
testifies. In the middle of trial, the prosecutor sometimes finds a pre-
viously unidentified witness who adds detail and depth to the crim-
inal acts. Comparing a guilty plea, a non-jury trial and a jury trial,
the conclusion is inescapable that judgments are ordinarily more
harsh in direct proportion to the fuller disclosures involved in those
proceedings. On a guilty plea, only the essentials of the offense are
presented in order to be sure that there is the corpus of a crime which
would warrant a conviction when the confession of guilt is added.
At trial, on a waiver or before a jury, the facts are developed at much
greater length. After a jury trial with lengthy summations by counsel
and charge by the court, the trial judge is very likely, at least sub-
consciously, to consider the case more serious, when it comes time to
sentence, than he would have if he had thought about it for only a
few minutes on a guilty plea.
The plea of guilty also removes the temptation for the guilty
defendant to perjure himself in his own defense. Prosecutors obviously
cannot bring charges for perjured testimony every time it occurs
without materially increasing the backlog, but the trial judge fre-
quently takes that factor into account on the day of sentencing. And
as Professor Newman has pointed out, the defendant who pleads guilty
ordinarily needs less of a penalty because he has already started the
process of rehabilitation after showing remorse. Without disagreeing
with the conclusion of Judge Duffy that "[a] defendant in a criminal
case should not be punished by a heavy sentence merely because he
exercises his constitutional right to be tried before an impartial
judge or jury,"6 these are some of the legitimate reasons for the trial
judge to impose a lesser sentence on a guilty plea.
But, facing the facts squarely, prosecutors and judges have been
heard to say that the state is entitled to its "full rights" when it comes
to sentencing after a protracted trial with the assertion by the defendant
of his "full rights." Wrong as that attitude is, some courts are influ-
enced by it. A realistic defense lawyer knows that he may save years
of time for his client by saving days of time for the court. Given the
assurance that those who plead are really guilty, which can be pro.
vided by diligent defense counsel, there are sound policy considera-
6. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 1960), cited by Professor Newman,
CONVICTION 65.
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tions for the court, the state and the defense to use plea bargaining in
the proper context.
A study of the general quality produced by Professor Newman
should also have devoted some attention to the problems on the hori-
zon for plea bargaining. Some recent decisions may curtail the use
of the bargained plea where such convictions have been reversed be-
cause of unsuspected nuances at the time the plea was entered. Or, such
decisions may merely make the prosecutor more careful in touching
all of the bases, if in fact he can identify them or anticipate new ones
before proceeding on the compromise plea.
Such problems are indicated by a recent opinion of Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, sitting in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.7 Cuevas has many similarities with
the variable guilt homicide in Philadelphia described earlier. Cuevas
and Carrasquillo, soon to be the deceased, quarrelled over a debt at
a dice game. The defendant claimed the deceased attacked him with
a knife. That was denied by other witnesses. After Cuevas shot Carras-
quillo, Cuevas went home, told his wife that he had shot someone
and called the police.
At trial Cuevas entered a plea to murder generally, and the Assistant
District Attorney certified that the offense rose no higher than murder
in the second degree. It is obvious that the normal precautions were
followed at the time the plea was entered from the following extract
from Judge Higginbotham's opinion:
With utmost caution his counsel advised the court as follows:
"If Your Honor, please, let the record show before the defendant
pleads generally guilty that the District Attorney intends to certify
with Your Honor's permission that this case does not rise higher
than second degree. I would like to have for the record an exam-
ination of this defendant so that he understands fully what the
situation is." The defendant was subsequently fully advised of
his rights to enter a not guilty plea, and, that "under those cir-
cumstances a jury could convict you of murder even up to the
first degree. Do you understand that?" Defendant: 'es."
Defendant admitted "that there had not been any promises
made to you of any kind." That "there has been no threats made
to you." That "you're doing this of your own free will"; that "you
understand all of the situation here"; and "you're satisfied to
plead guilty under those circumstances?" His reply was that as
7. United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 258 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa. 19N.3),
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a result of entering a guilty plea his only understanding was that
"it can't go higher than second degree."
Cuevas was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced
to 7 to 18 years in prison.
Cuevas successfully attacked the conviction in the United States
District Court on the contention that his guilty plea was induced by
a statement which was obtained in violation of the United States
Consitution pre-Escobedo. Rejecting the Commonwealth's contention
that the conviction should stand because the statement was exculpatory,
Judge Higginbotham found that there was psychological coercion in
the obtaining of the statement because of the defendant's limited in-
tellect, fatigue, poor emotional health and police deception. The court
rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the statement was im-
material to the plea of guilty by finding that the "plea of guilty was
induced by the existence of the statement." This decision requires
that the prosecutor be extremely circumspect in plea bargaining where
there are any conceivable constitutional infirmities underlying the
plea which may later be raised.
On the facts of this case, characterized by Judge Higginbotham
as "unique, ' '10 no appeal was taken by the Commonwealth. It was
decided that it would be preferable to accommodate our practices to
the problems inherent in the Cuevas situation rather than risk broader
application through appellate review. But the case does obviously raise
many problems on the compromise plea for murder in the second de-
gree, which is the only substantial use made of this procedure in
Philadelphia today.
Another troublesome consideration is the question of consent or
voluntariness in the entry of the guilty plea. This subject is dis-
cussed by Professor Newman, but more attention needs to be given
to the procedures for nullifying the conviction on a later contention
of lack of requisite voluntariness or consent. A relatively recent cele-
brated case in Philadelphia raised this question in a very unusual
context where the penalty was not compromised and the Assistant
District Attorney had no part in any bargaining. During the course of
jury selection in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Scoleri,
the defendant's lawyer approached several judges, none of whom was
the presiding judge, to determine their "feelings about death sen-
8. Id. at 659.
9. Id. at 656.
10. Id. at 660.
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tences!"" as a preliminary to considering a change in plea to murder
generally before a three judge panel. The history of this involved
case indicated that defense counsel had good reason to believe that his
client's interests would be well served if he received life imprison-
ment on a guilty plea.12 Scoleri did ultimately change his plea to guilty,
and one of the judges, to whom defense counsel talked, was ultimately
called to sit on a three judge panel to hear the evidence on Scoleri's
guilty plea. The proceedings show that the court and prosecutor
questioned the defendant very extensively on the voluntariness of
his plea and his understanding that there was no commitment as to
penalty.'3
After the three judge court imposed the death penalty, defense
counsel asked leave to withdraw the plea of guilty on the ground that
he had a flat promise from one judge that he would impose life im-
prisonment. An extensive hearing followed on the motion to with-
draw the plea of guilty. The judge alleged to have made the commit-
ment withdrew from the bench, appeared as a witness, and denied
any such commitment.
Declaring the case to be "sui generis," the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania permitted the withdrawal of the guilty plea, indicating that the
key considerations were the belief of the defense lawyer rather than
precisely what the judge said, the statements by the defense lawyer to
the defendant, and the reliance of the defendant in entering the guilty
plea on his lawyer's statements. Since "sui generis" cases are frequently
precedents for later cases, the Scoleri decision gives this prosecutor
some concern over the finality of the guilty plea process. Despite such
reversals, the guilty plea process makes sense from the state's viewpoint,
and the prosecutor cannot be unduly concerned about those appellate
problems, because he has so many others.
Experience in Philadelphia corroborates Professor Newman's con-
clusion that plea bargaining is here to stay. In the proper context it
has a legitimate place in the administration of criminal justice. Profes-
sor Newman's book should help project it into the proper context.
ARLEN SPEaCER7f
11. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 223, 202 A2d 521,523 (1964).
12. On three occasions the death sentence has been pronounced. Twice the judgments
have been reversed, and an appeal is now pending from the third trial.
13. 415 Pa. at 224-26,202 A.2d at 524-25.
t District Attorney of Philadelphia. BA. 1951, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1956,
Yale University.
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Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence
Without Trial. By Donald J. Newman. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1966. Pp. xxvii, 259. $8.50.
To begin with the undeniable conclusion of this American Bar
Foundation study: "Most criminal cases . . . are processed through
the court stages of the criminal justice system without formal contest
.... [T]he guilty plea, the negotiated plea ... form one of the most
important processes in day-by-day criminal justice administration, and
yet one that has been largely neglected in professional literature, by
researchers, and by lawmaking bodies."' In the same vein, the na-
tional Crime Commission's current studies, as reported by the chairman,
former Attorney General Katzenbach, "sharply remind us of the in-
formal, off-the-record and invisible nature of so much of the negotiating
and adjusting process ... [T]here are virtually no guidelines or reports
or commentaries about decisions which represent more than 90 per cent
of the cases which involve liberty or imprisonment for millions every
year.' 2 Chairman Katzenbach calls for research "in the spirit that organ-
ized the American Bar Foundation,"3 but does not add that this spirit
has now produced an important report on plea bargaining.4 The pres-
ent volume fails, however, to supply the needed "guidelines."
Newman's significant and to date unique contribution lies in his
patient observations of what he aptly styles "the guilty plea process."
His painstaking descriptions of its actual operation will furnish back-
drop and stimulus for the recent wave of judicial and extrajudiciala
1. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: TuE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE 'WITHOUT TRIAL
231 (1966). Newman treats another "major form of non-trial adjudication . . .summary
acquittal of certain guilty defendants by the trial judge." Ibid. This, however, is outside
the scope of the Journal's present symposium.
2. Katzenbach, President's Law Enforcement Commission Urges the Legal Profession's
Co-operation, 52 A.B.A.J. 1013, 1015 (1966). The proper name for the "Crime Commission"
is the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. There
was a separate President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. [This review
went to press before publication of the national Crime Commission's report. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TilE CHALLENGE OF
CIM IN A F=ax Soc ry 134-37 (1967) (dealing with negotiated pleas). Ed.]
3. Id. at 1016.
4. The present volume is the second published in the American Bar Foundation's
Series on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States. See the preface by
ABF Administrator Hazard, CONvCTnON ix.
5. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 1963); United States cx rel.
McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101,
112-13, rev'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), revzd on confession of
error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958); Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Ore. 1963), afl'd, 327
F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, No. 128 (Sup. Ct. Pa.,
Nov. 15, 1966).
6. See Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955); Newman, Pleading
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interest in guilty plea dispositions. The value of Newman's descriptive
work overshadows his lack of meaningful statistics, the narrowness of
his sampling, the general dullness of his style, and even the limited
perspective from which he evaluates the adequacy and fairness of the
present system.
The flaw which may account for these others, however, lies in the
misconception revealed in Newman's subtitle: The Determination of
Guilt or Innocence Without Trial. The premise of the adversary system
is that guilt is a legal conclusion based upon facts found at trial. Thus
when asked, as they often are, whether they would defend a guilty man,
lawyers commonly reply that until verdict, guilt is undecided. Newman
furnishes ample examples which show that the guilty plea is not de-
signed to resolve the issue of factual or moral guilt. Pleas are often the
result of bargaining in which the defendant foregoes trial in exchange
for concessions, such as reduction of the charge, dropping of counts, or
in some jurisdictions a recommendation as to sentence. The terms of
the bargain are not determined by conceptions of actual guilt, but by
such considerations as the strength of the government's evidence, the
accused's prior record, the currency of the court's docket, and the cus-
tomary concessions for a particular offense. This is not to say or suggest
that many demonstrably innocent people plead guilty. Most who so
plead would be found guilty if they stood trial.7 This fact is in the
background of all bargaining. But the entry of a guilty plea in an in-
dividual case does not necessarily reflect anyone's determination, even
Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CauM. LC. & P.S. 780 (1956);
Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YASE L.J. 204 (1956); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); Rm, oRr oF Tm Pmsmwur's Costm",'oN
ON CRiE iN =H DnsmRcr OF COLUMBIA 240-44, 248, 253-54, 276, 288, 384-89, 396-99 (1966).
7. Of course there is no way to determine how many of such defendants would be ac-
quitted at trial, but there is no reason to believe that the figure would be negligible. Most
convictions are on pleas of guilty; but a substantial minority of those defendants who go
to trial are acquitted.
In the federal system, during fiscal year 1965, 25,757 defendants were convicted upon
a plea of guilty; of those who stood trial, 3,221 were convicted and 1,319 acquitted (55407
defendants' cases were dismissed without trial). UNrrm STXrmm DEPATm T-r oF JutscE,
UNriaD STATES ATroRNEYS' STATscAL REPORT, Fisc.k YEa 1965, at 1 & Table 2. The per-
centage of those ultimately acquitted (or dismissed) would be increased as a result of re-
versals on appeal.
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, during the fiscal years
1950 through 1966, the conviction rate of those who have stood trial for felonies has ranged
between 67 and 79 per cent. REPORT OF THE PmSwaENs COMMSSION ON Crussa LN Tm
DLsrucr oF CoLUmmiA 244-45 & Table 6 (1966). During the same period between 50 and 60
per cent of all defendants indicted pleaded guilty each year compared to 20 to 26 per cent
who were convicted after trial. "3etween 6 and 11 per cent were acquitted, and between 9
and 19 per cent dismissed. Id. at 242, Table 4.
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the defendant's,8 of guilt. In effect, though not in law, the defendant
pleading guilty says: Nolo contendere. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently recognized in McCoy v. United States0 what Professor
Newman has ignored-the possibility that a guilty plea may not be a
concession of actual guilt. In McCoy, a 19-year-old, semi-literate defen-
dant attempted to plead guilty to a much reduced charge at the close of
the government's case against him. The government had made a prima
facie case on the felony charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
But through the efforts of defense counsel and with the agreement of the
prosecutor and court, the opportunity had arisen for him to plead
guilty to taking property without right, a misdemeanor carrying a maxi-
mum penalty of six months. The defendant said he would like to plead
and the court began the ritual, similar to that in most jurisdictions,
designed to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea.
The defendant was asked whether he understood that he would have
a right to continue a speedy trial by jury with the aid of counsel, but
that he would have no such right if his plea were accepted; whether he
knew that he would have the assistance of counsel at the time of sen-
tencing; whether he understood the nature of the charges against him
(and the charges were outlined). To all of this he made the prescribed
answers, but when the court said: "Did you in fact do that?" the de-
fendant answered: "No, Sir." At this point the court advised him that
if he had not taken the property the court could not allow him to plead
guilty.
The Defendant: "Your Honor, if I am willing to plead to this
lesser charge, could I plead?"
The Court: "You can't plead before me to a charge to which you
say you are not guilty. No sir, you cannot do that."
Whereupon the jury was called back, the trial proceeded, and the
defendant was duly convicted and sentenced to eighteen months to
three years in prison. On appeal he argued that the benefits of a guilty
plea should not be conditioned on a confession. The Court of Appeals,
although affirming the conviction, agreed that a defendant should not
be required publicly to resolve against himself all doubts as to guilt.
8. The defendant may be the least competent to judge this issue since lie may feel
psychological guilt where he has no legal guilt, believe in his innocence when legally cul-
pable, or entertain a deep sense of justification in the rightness of his illegal acts.
9. "I will not contest it." BLAct, LAw DixcroNtRY 1198 (4th ed. 1951).
10. 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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An accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts respecting
his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury would be con-
vinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by
pleading guilty; or for other reasons he might wish to avoid fur-
ther contest: ... "the right of a defendant so to plead has never
been doubted. He must be permitted to judge for himself in this
respect" . . [G]uilt or the degree of guilt, is at times uncertain
and elusive. The result of trial of a particular case rests with a jury
of twelve, or with a trial judge where there is no jury.
But Professor Newman engages in no search for distinctions between
what is said and what is meant in pleading guilty; he proceeds to the
sociologist's task of describing the process. In doing so, he leaves out
many real-life variables familiar to the lawyer. His description appears
limited, for example, to the bargainer who has nothing to offer but his
plea. The defendant or prospective defendant from whom the prosecu-
tion can obtain desired testimony or information as part of its bargain,
stands to secure a more lenient plea or sentence (if not an outright
dismissal or withholding of charges). The uses and potential abuses 1
of this mode of bargaining are among the topics of little apparent in-
terest to the author of Conviction, although they are of central impor-
tance to both the guilty plea and the trial." Such omissions in Professor
Newman's oversimplified model of the guilty plea "process" cause us
to differ with the American Bar Foundation's opinion: "It is especially
appropriate, therefore, that this volume . . . should have been the
work of a criminologist rather than of a person whose training is in the
law."13
The interaction of the guilty plea and trial processes, although ac-
knowledged by Newman in general terms,14 is ignored when it comes
to specifics. Thus the role which Newman assigns defense counsel "in
the guilty plea process"5 appears to begin with the decision to plead
guilty-counsel becomes part of "the conviction system . . . the con-
viction process."' 6 Newman notes that prosecutors reduce the degree
11. Widespread awareness of this problem developed during the trials of Roy Cohn,
where it appeared that government witnesses who had pleaded guilty to other charges had
remained unsentenced for many months pending their testimony at Cohn's trial.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 1960): "It is a wen un-
derstood practice for the prosecutor and the chief executive concerned to give appropriate
consideration to witnesses who have assisted the government. The witnesses concerned are
aware that this is so; the jurors and the general public are also aware of this practice."
13. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Administrator, American Bar Foundation, Preface to CO.'vc.
TION X.
14. "The philosophy, the objectives, the procedures, and the protections of the trial set
standards of criminal justice administration that influence all other stages of the process
from arrest to correctional treatment." CoNvIcrboN 231.
15. Part VI of CoimarioN is devoted to the topic of defense counsel's role.
16. CO NVIcrON 198.
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of a charge because they have self-instilled doubts about the sufficiency
of their evidence to convict of a more serious offense 17 or even doubts
derived from ex parte judicial advice. 18 But Newman does not consider
that defense counsel can also be the source of the prosecutor's dilemma:
e.g., by a successful motion to suppress items of evidence, or through
cross-examination of witnesses at the preliminary examination. Even
a denied pre-trial motion to suppress can, by preserving a substantial
issue for the eventuality of an appeal, induce a better plea offer from
the prosecution. The entry of the guilty plea should be defense coun-
sel's last pre-sentence step, not his first, in "the conviction process" of an
adversary system. The criminal defendant, like the civil plaintiff, other
things being equal,' 9 is likely to receive his best settlement offer on the
eve of trial.20 But these are aspects of the plea bargaining process to
which a lawyer would be more sensitive than a criminologist.2'
Such criticism aside, however, the book is valuable because in simply
stating the facts, opining little and offering less in the way of solutions,
it gives ample evidence of the deep difficulties in the present system.
From the examples offered, it is plain that plea bargaining is a pervasive
process which is unequally available. In some courts only the criminal
lawyers know how and where to approach the prosecutors; unrepre-
sented defendants may have little idea of how to get the best value for
giving up their trials. In most systems, customary reductions have arisen
for certain charges. A Michigan narcotics violation carrying a heavy
mandatory sentence is, for instance, routinely reduced to a charge with-
out mandatory sentence in return for a plea to the lesser offense.22 This
reduction is available without particular regard to the strength or weak-
17. Id. at 68-69.
18. Id. at 69-70.
19. Money is at least a more fit subject of barter than liberty, so that the analogy be.
tween criminal and civil settlement procedures is hardly perfect. But the criminal defen-
dant who is doing dead time in jail because of inability to make bond is comparable to
the impecunious disabled plaintiff, who may receive and accept an inferior offer from the
insurance company because he cannot afford to wait for trial. For the federal system the
Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C.A. § 8146 (Supp. 1966), promises to bring the indigent
defendant's bargaining position nearer to equality with the better-heeled.
20. On the other hand, a criminal defendant may be under pressure to settle his case
before it is reached for trial in those multi-judge courts where, by so doing, he receives
the opportunity to choose a sentencing judge who has developed a reputation for relative
leniency, or to avoid one whose sentencing reputation is harsh. Some court assignment
systems are designed to encourage this type of forum shopping, in order to increase tile
number of guilty pleas and "move the calendar." See, e.g., REPORT OF TIE PWSIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTucr OF COLUMBIA 386-89, 397-99 (1966); SuniN, ClRuINA.
JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT 88 (1966) ("Court administrators can, in the placement
of judges, clearly affect the rate of guilty pleas').
21. Newman's background as a criminologist makes him more sensitive, however, to
the relation between the plea and the correctional and probation processes. See, e.g., CON-
VICrION 98, 103-04.
22. Id. at 79.
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ness of the government's case-available, that is, to the defendant who
knows, or whose lawyer knows, that bargaining is the modus vivendi.
In cases where there has been a lot of publicity or strong local pressure
to bring the accused to trial, the prosecutor may be unwilling to make
any bargain.23 The source of some of the inequities is also documented.
Professor Newman explains with examples the course of plea bargain-
ing. The process itself is a matter of give and take. Personality, games-
manship, and knowing the way around the courthouse are important.
24
The book offers evidence of the distortions of the legal system which
result from plea bargaining. Defendants plead to offenses whose de-
scriptions do not match the acts which they committed.5 Because some
bargain and some don't and some bargain better than others, the al-
ready appalling sentencing differentials between crimes essentially the
same are further increased. Rituals which require that the defendant
state that he is pleading guilty because he is guilty and for no other
reason, put many bargaining defendants in the position of making
misrepresentations to the court.
In short, the book raises serious questions about the fairness and
adequacy of the present system of entering guilty pleas. The discussion
is not furthered, however, by the author's uncritical acceptance of the
basic philosophy of the "guilty plea process"; Newman seems to indulge
an operating presumption of the defendant's guilt. Thus he sees the
equity in allowing lesser offense pleas to narcotics possession for all
Michigan defendants charged with narcotics sale, carrying a prepos-
terous mandatory sentence of 25 years.20 But not a word for the plight
of the narcotics sale defendant, presumed to be innocent, who has a
good faith defense of fact or law-but can litigate it only at the risk of
a grossly unfair sentence. Professor Newman offers no guidance on the
role of counsel in advising such a defendant, whose good faith denial
or alibi may be less convincing to the jury than the officer's allegedly
mistaken identification. Is it surprising if "innocent" defendants, ad-
vised of their rights and their risks, will elect to plead guilty to posses-
sion to avoid a possible conviction for sale?2 7 Is it surprising if prosecu-
tors will routinely charge a sale in order to induce a plea to possession?
Is it the exception "where deliberate (or sometimes inadvertent) over-
23. Id. at 83.
24. Id. at 80-82.
25. Id. at 100. See Taylor, Book Review, 76 YALE UJ. 598 (1967).
26. CaONvCnoN 112-14.
27. Perhaps this falls within Newman's concept of "successful representation of the
guilty." Id. at 198.
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charging is used to force a plea" 28 or is that the name of the game: plea
bargaining?
Risking a harsh mandatory sentence for refusing to plead guilty is
the extreme situation. The more usual risk is that the judge will in the
exercise of his sentencing discretion impose a greater penalty if the
defendant stands trial than he would if the defendant pled guilty to
the same offense, and than he could if the defendant pled guilty to a
lesser offense. Newman makes clear that the risk in many instances is
a real one; the system depends upon its being so. "[I]t is apparent that
the overriding motivation in showing leniency to defendants who plead
guilty is to encourage a steady flow of guilty pleas .... Realistically, the
guilty plea process operates effectively only if defendants come to expect,
and do receive, greater leniency in sentencing on a plea of guilty than
if they demand trial." 29
This documented observation, even if it but confirms the expected,
is the most revealing conclusion of the study. It also raises the most
critical problem-a problem not resolved by styling as "differential
leniency" 30 what is additional punishment for defendants who "de-
mand" what the Constitution prescribes.3 1 In other contexts it has been
held that the government may not condition receipt of public benefits
upon the waiver of a constitutional right, nor impose penalties for its
exercise.32 If the more severely sentenced defendant who stood trial
could ever demonstrate, in his individual case, what Newman demon-
strates for the generality of cases, his sentence might well be held in-
valid.
33
28. The phraseology is quoted from id. at 68. Unfortunately, Newman does not further
discuss the practice of deliberate overcharging, or tell us whether he found it widespread.
29. Id. at 62, 66. Accord, ". . . [t]he imposition of more lenient sentences upon guilty
pleas or conversely the imposition of harsher sentences on defendants after trial is often
primarily motivated by calendar concerns. Lenience is the defendant's reward for his con-
tribution to the prompt processing of criminal cases." REPORT or viia PRESIDENT'S COM -
MISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIscr OF COLUMBIA 385 (1966).
30. CONVICTION 62.
31. The federal provisions are in Article III, § 2 ("The trial of all crimes, except in case
of impeachment, shall be by jury"), and the Sixth Amendment ("in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury').
32. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See generally, Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960). The Court's description in
Verner, supra, at 404, of the grim choice between surrendering a First Amendment right
and foregoing unemployment benefits may be applied to the choice between surrendering
Sixth Amendment rights to an adversary trial by jury and foregoing "differential leniency.'
"Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of [the right of jury trial] as would a fine imposed against [a defendant for
standing trial]." See id. at 404.
33. For a rare example where the record affirmatively showed that the sentence was
significantly influenced by defendant's standing trial instead of pleading guilty, see United
States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960), discussed in CONVICTION 65-66. The Hruska
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As in other areas of the law, the attorney for the accused must con-
scientiously seek his client's best interest within the existing system.
Plea bargaining will therefore remain an integral part of counsel's
"successful representation of the guilty,"34 and of those who may not
be guilty, so long as "differential leniency" is the accepted reward or
result of copping a plea. Ultimately we believe that correctional 3s and
constitutional considerations will overcome the arguments of adminis-
trative convenience that make plea bargaining3 work, that afford "the
overriding motivation.., to encourage and maintain a steady flow of
guilty pleas." 37 The construction of constitutional barriers to adminis-
trative convenience in pre-trial police procedures has advanced steadily
in recent years. The trend should also reach the adjudicatory stage. The
Supreme Court has, for instance, been reluctant to allow waiver under
pressure of safeguards against pre-trial acknowledgment of guilt.38 This
reluctance may one day reach the courthouse "guilty plea process."
Fundamental changes in "the guilty plea process" will depend upon
substantive and procedural changes in the sentencing system. Substan-
tively, there must be legislative alteration of our severe and irrational
statutory sentence pattern. Procedurally, courts might experiment with
removing the sentencing function from the judge who, by trial or plea,
adjudicates guilt; this would help to eliminate differential treatment of
defendants who stand or who waive trial. At least, it would help the
situation in which--despite a good faith defense-."a realistic defense
lawyer knows that he may save years of time for his client by saving days
of time for the court." 39 Already some courts are willing to innovate.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
bill for appellate review of sentencing would have provided that reasons for the sentence
imposed be placed upon the record. Such legislation would have the important by-product
of developing appellate standards as to the factors which may be considered in sentencing.
34. CotvxC-oTN 198.
35. The adverse effects of plea bargaining on the correctional process are noted in
the REPORT OF THE PRES IENT's COMMISSION ON Crm IN THE Disrrcr OF COLUU3IA 385-86
(1966). "The Commission is concerned with the extent to which the court sentences more
leniently where offenders plead rather than go to trial .... If there is an optimal sentence
for each offender, departing from this sentence because of the needs of judicial administra-
tion will not enhance the likelihood of rehabilitation. It is the Commission's view that
the state of the criminal court calendar should not be a factor in sentencing." Ibid. See
also SUBm, CRMNAL JUsTIc IN A METROPOLTAN COURT 119 (1966).
36. Mr. Specter makes the important point that in his jurisdiction plea bargaining is
not an administrative necessity, due to the widespread acceptance of judge instead of jury
trial. We would value his observation as to whether any "differential leniency" is shown
to convicted defendants who have waived jury trial compared to those who have not.
Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE LJ. 604 (1967).
37. CONVICTION 62.
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Specter, supra note 36.
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uses a three judge panel to recommend sentences. 40 It would have been
fruitful if Newman's field study of the Michigan state procedures had
been extended to the federal courthouse in Detroit.
But in order adequately to determine whether the guilty plea process
can or should eventually survive in any form, we believe that its present
form and forum should be changed now. Conviction makes plain that
the record of the real considerations which determine a plea bargain is
not made in open court but in the prosecutor's office, on his telephone,
in the court corridor or recess. We believe that the present guilty plea
courtroom ritual should be supplanted by a frank statement of parties
and counsel of the considerations underlying the proffered plea. Instead
of a ritual affirmative response to the Court's query-
Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other
reason?
41
we would like to see a forthright answer by defendant and his counsel
to the question: Why are you pleading guilty to this offense? If we may
hypothesize an answer:
Defendant: Your Honor, I am pleading guilty to attempted house-
breaking because, from what my lawyer told me, it seemed the best
thing for me to do.
Defense counsel: Your Honor, I did indeed advise the defendant
with respect to this plea to a misdemeanor, which the prose-
cutor offered yesterday. The prosecutor made available to me
for interviewing the arresting officers, who claimed to have seen
the defendant leave the store and to have followed him from
the store to his home nearby where he was arrested. I think
it is a close question whether the officers unlawfully gained entry
to the home, and whether under Wong Sun, the motions judge
erred in denying my motion to suppress the threshold admission
which the officers claim-and the defendant denies-was made.
The defendant has told me that he is not guilty, and that he was
returning from a late walk by himself when he passed the store.
The only corroborative testimony I have been able to find is from
the other defendant, who has already pleaded guilty to house-
breaking. He was caught in the store and says that he broke in by
himself. He and my client are old friends and I therefore have
considerable doubt that the jury would accept the credibility of
his testimony. My own client's credibility might be impeached by
40. Parsons, Aids in Sentencing, 33 F.R.D. 423, 431-33 (1964). A similar procedure was
later adopted for the Northern District of Illinois. Parsons, supra, at 433-34.
41. This particular form of the question was prescribed by Resolution of the judges
of the District of Columbia, 1959, reprinted in Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 980
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See CoNvirloN 7, for a similar illustration from a Michigan state court.
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two prior convictions for petit larceny. Under the circumstances I
advised the defendant that it was probable, though of course not
certain, that the jury would convict him; that I estimated it was
about a fifty-fifty chance that the Court of Appeals would reverse
his conviction because of the threshhold admission, but that there
was still a pretty good chance that he would be convicted at a re-
trial without the statement. I explained to him that the house-
breaking charge was a felony for which he could get a maximum
of fifteen years; and that the attempt was a misdemeanor for which
the maximum is a year, and for which I thought your Honor
would seriously consider placing him on probation. The defendant
slept on it and told me this morning that he wanted to plead
guilty.
Government counsel: Your Honor, I agree with defense counsel's
assessment of the chances for a conviction here. I would not rate
the chances for a reversal quite as high as he does-in fact I might
not even use the statement-but I don't think that it is worth the
government's while to litigate this case for two years, and con-
ceivably have the defendant end up scot free. Anyway, I don't think
that the defendant's record is bad enough so that a lengthy sentence
of imprisonment would be imposed if he were convicted of house-
breaking.
An expanded version of this sort of dialogue, including a careful
judicial inquiry into whether the defendant understands his counsel's
representations, should supplement the questions now asked at sen-
tencing. Such a procedure would put the bargain on the table for the
court to consider and for the world to see. The recently promulgated
revision of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, offers a basis
for the suggested procedure in federal courts. The Rule previously pro-
vided, as it still does, that the court should refuse to accept a plea unless
it is made voluntarily with an understanding of the charges. But the
amendment adds that "The court shall not enter a plea of guilty unless
it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." Clearly the
amendment envisions a fuller inquiry than is now conducted at the
acceptance of a plea. The Advisory Committee Notes to the amended
Rule 11 explain that the court, in determining the factual basis
for the plea, may make its "inquiry of the defendant or the at-
torney for the government, or by examining the presentence report,
or otherwise." In pursuing the further inquiry which the new rule
provides, the court could bring out the details of the plea bargain, as
we have illustrated above. The judges of the federal district courts, or
the federal courts of appeals in the exercise of their supervisory power
over lower courts within their circuits, could establish, by order, the
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procedure outlined as standard for entering a plea of guilty. State courts
could take similar action as to their own procedures. It would then be
the duty of the individual judges before whom pleas were made to
ensure that the new procedure did not devolve into a meaningless
ritual.
The transcript of such a proceeding would be a useful record if the
circumstances surrounding the plea were collaterally attacked. Defense
counsel's outline of reasons for advising a plea could serve as an index
to his effectiveness. (Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most
common allegations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.) Since counsel's repre-
sentations would be made on the record in the presence of the de-
fendant, the allegation would less often arise that the defendant was
misled into entering the plea. The proposed system should not over-
burden the courts. Although pleading guilty would take somewhat
longer than the 10 minutes or so now required, it would seldom take as
much as an hour.
Greater exposure would result in greater regulation of the plea
bargaining process. Bringing the considerations into the open should
also furnish data for the ultimate decision as to whether plea bargaining




t Member of Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars. B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1960, Yale
University; Ph.D. 1960, University of London.
* Member of Maryland and District of Columbia Bars. B.A. 1960, University of Penn-
sylvania; LL.B. 1963, Yale University.
622
Vol. 76: 568, 1967
